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                                    Abstract 
 
The first part of this thesis focuses on the application of Value-at-risk (VaR) in defining a 
financial institution’s exposure to systemic risk. Specifically, I apply an extension of it in 
the form of Delta-CoVaR as suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and then 
further developed by Castro et al (2014). In both cases, it is suggested that, rather than 
quantifying an institution’s risk in isolation through its own VaR, you should consider the 
negative risk-spillover effects of all institutions on the whole financial system. Therefore, 
I assess the contribution of an individual institution to a region’s systemic risk and this is 
done for a sample of 29 European banks and Insurance Companies. I note their individual 
systemic risk contributions in the first instance and assess their respective significance 
through bootstrapping. Furthermore, I note whether there is any significance in relation to 
the underlying sector, in particular the insurance sector, and country of origin of the 
company. Both are shown to be of importance to regulatory authorities in determining 
capital requirements for the largest institutional investors in the financial industry. The 
results suggest that the insurance sector is systemically important and that a high 1% 
individual VaR does not necessarily yield the largest contribution to the VaR of the whole 
system – thereby illustrating the importance of considering Delta-CoVaR.  
Chapter 4 provides an extension to the preceding chapter in relation to providing further 
evidence of the need to consider interlinkages and coupling within the financial system. 
This is done through application of the Absorption Ratio (AR) to ten European banks and 
insurance companies. In this case, the AR does not appear to act as an early warning 
indicator of market turmoil. However, one principal component is identified as explaining 
70 to 80% of the variability in the assets’ returns for the period under review. A high AR 
suggests the stocks are more tightly coupled and provides evidence of interlinkages across 
two subsectors and a number of countries within Europe – thereby illustrating the extent 
of financial linkages.  
Chapter 5 considers a methodology for deriving stock returns and VaR through the 
application of a Bayesian Network (BN). A network map is specified where the returns for 
three stocks are deemed to be conditionally dependent on two factors. The latter are defined 
having previously considered literature relating to the financial crisis and risk contagion. 
Subsequently, two factors are identified as influencing the individual stock returns – one 
relating to liquidity and the other relating to the market. Following application of the 
Gaussian Bayesian Network, regressions generate models for the said returns. The latter 
are then used to simulate time series of stock returns and those outcomes are compared to 
the original data series. The BN specification is found to be a satisfactory alternative for 
the modelling of stock returns. Furthermore, the resulting quantiles are shown to be more 
prudent estimates in relation to VaR calculations at the 5% level and, therefore, can result 
in increases in regulatory capital.  
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           Introduction
                      - 2 - 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Systemic Risk Defined 
The risk of collapse of a financial system has been debated at length and the components and 
dimensions of systemic risk subsequently brought to the fore. A broad history of financial crises 
illustrates their extreme costs to the wider domestic economy and, at their worst, to the wider 
global economy - as evidenced by the 2008 crisis. Thereby, the need for increased awareness and 
more substantive and effective regulation around systemic risk is very high on the agenda. 
However, for such regulatory enhancement to be effective, one has to have greater clarity of what 
defines systemic risk and whether there are any key features or common attributes to the various 
financial failings of the past.  
Without any context, a dictionary definition of the word systemic is “relating to a system as 
opposed to a particular part.1” In this case, the system could be the entire financial system as 
opposed to just one institution or sector within it. From an industry standpoint, the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIC) defines systemic risk as: 
 
“a risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or 
parts of the financial system and has the potential to have serious negative 
consequences for the real economy.” 
 
The words, “a risk of disruption” as opposed to catastrophic failure appear to underplay the 
significance of systemic risk but the subsequent impact is clarified in the potential serious negative 
consequences for the real economy resulting from the said disruption. Other definitions comment 
                                               
1 Oxford English Dictionary (2017) 
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on a likelihood or probability of cumulative losses resulting from an event. Whereby the event 
itself triggers a series of losses amongst the majority of financial institutions deemed to be the 
constituents of the financial system. Indeed, the latter are considered by Chan et al (2005) who 
describe systemic risk as “the possibility of a series of correlated defaults among financial 
institutions, typically banks, that occur over a short period of time, often caused by a single major 
event.” However, the triggering event does not have to be a major one – from a moderate shock to 
the financial system you may witness significant volatility in asset prices, reduced liquidity in the 
markets and subsequent problems in the inter-bank markets. Furthermore, the shock or event itself 
may be confined to the financial system of one global region or then spread to multiple regions. 
The similarities appear to be the occurrence of a loss inducing event, however large or small and 
the repercussions spreading across the entire financial system and wider economy where both may 
be regarded as localised or global.  
 
The spreading effect is what makes systemic risk so dangerous and harmful to the stability of any 
financial system and economy per se. It occurs because of the interlinkages that exist between 
financial institutions within and across regions. In order to articulate the objectives of this thesis, 
I firstly present some context to systemic risk through a discussion of the aforementioned 
spreading effect, the inter-linkages that exist within and between financial systems and the 
subsequent consequences of those inter-linkages. Furthermore, another consideration is the 
contagion effect as discussed and defined by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and deemed appropriate 
given the empirical analyses presented in chapters three, four and five. Specifically, an important 
distinction is made between markets being highly correlated due to continuing strong linkages 
 - 4 - 
between markets and institutions as opposed to an increase in such linkages during and following 
financial crises.  
 
1.2 The Spreading and Contagion Effects 
Aside from the 2008 crisis, there are several instances in recent times where events have created a 
spread in losses across an entire financial system and wider ramifications for the economy as a 
whole. A suggested common underlying factor in relation to each financial crisis is the growth in 
consumer credit and bank lending. This is discussed by Allen and Gale (2007) in relation to 
Scandinavia who note that between 1985 and 1986, consumer and corporate borrowing increased 
by 40 percent in the region. Following a triggering event of the collapse in oil prices, upon which 
the region relied so heavily, the economy stalled, asset prices dropped, banks tightened lending 
and the housing market crashed. Many of the banks were left with loan balances linked to assets 
that had previously been severely overvalued. The government intervened to stem the crisis but it 
spread across the region’s financial system and a recession followed - it did not have a global 
impact. A similar situation arose in Japan in the 1980s, where, once again there was a huge 
expansion in credit, asset prices rose and the Nikkei 225 market index reached an all-time high in 
1989. A tightening in monetary policy in early 1990 led to a sharp and sudden rise in interest rates, 
the subsequent impacts being a significant drop in available credit, the markets and real estate 
values. Takeo and Kashyap (2004) argue that the Japanese economy had still not recovered by 
early 2003 and highlight the linkages between the wider economy and the financial system.  
In contrast, impacts of other financial crises have spread far beyond their point of origination. The 
currency crisis arising in East Asia in 1997 is a prime example. Chang (1999) argues that the crisis 
stemmed from a dramatic upward valuation in many of the region’s currencies during the 1990s 
 - 5 - 
due to record levels of growth, foreign portfolio and direct investment, which were ultimately not 
sustainable. Diao et al (2000) further add that a general lack of confidence in the region’s 
regulatory controls and financial systems led to a sudden reversal of capital inflows where 
investors liquidated their positions in the various asset classes. The latter presented an enormous 
shock to the East Asian economies, subsequent devaluation in currencies, tightening of bank 
lending, rising interest rates and severe contraction of money supply from bank sources.  
In terms of spread, there are several distinguishable sources in this example. For instance, the Thai 
Baht was the first of the currencies to devalue which subsequently impacted its competing 
neighbours in both the import and export markets – Thailand’s goods became cheaper than those 
of Indonesia. Furthermore, imports to Thailand from Laos became more expensive and demand 
reduced – amounting to spreading across trading channels. Of greater relevance to this thesis, is 
the spread that existed across financial channels, as clarified by Walker (1998). Aside from the 
impact on chains of banks across the East Asia region the crisis created a lack of confidence in 
Emerging markets in general. A sell-off occurred across all emerging market investments – 
including those linked to South America and former Eastern European countries. Therefore, in 
relation to systemic risk, the currency crises of East Asia, Argentina (2001) and Russia (1998) 
represent occurrences of a trigger event as proposed by Schwarz (2008). Whereby, there is an 
economic shock or institutional failure, causing a chain of bad economic consequences. In all of 
the examples presented, financial institutions suffered significant losses and the global markets 
experienced excessive price volatility.  
Having illustrated that significant market movements can affect other markets across regions and 
the globe, it is important to clarify whether, what appear to be highly correlated market movements, 
provide evidence of the existence of the contagion effect. Forbes and Rigobon (2002 p.2) define 
 - 6 - 
the latter as “a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or group 
of countries).” If cross-market links do not increase significantly, but rather continue due to high 
levels of correlation, then the latter is more likely a further indication of persistent strong links 
across the global financial system as opposed to evidence of contagion. This thesis does not 
investigate differences in cross-market linkages pre and post financial crisis, rather it indicates that 
the financial crisis was so severe because of the mere existence of linkages and high correlations 
in the first instance.  
 
 
1.3 Interlinkages in the Financial System 
Given the severity and spread of the global crisis in 2008, it provides suitable examples to illustrate 
the interlinkages in the financial system. Essentially, the catalyst for it was the extent of the losses 
sustained through the defaults in the sub-prime domestic mortgage markets in the United States. 
Such losses ultimately created a domino effect and amplification across global financial markets. 
Preceding this, global stock markets had experienced several years of healthy prosperity, for 
instance, the FTSE-All-Share index reached an all-time high of 3490.172 as at 13th August 2007. 
For the subsequent crisis to have been so prolific, it suggests that a rise in US mortgage 
delinquency rates was not the only issue – indeed, the following discussion presents other critical 
factors. 
 
 
 
                                               
2 Bloomberg 
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1.3.1 The Demand for Securitised Products 
One has to ask why borrowers, with a high probability of default, were given access to the funds 
in the first instance. Keys et al (2008) provide evidence to suggest that the increased demand for 
securitised products led to a decline in the credit quality of the underlying mortgagee. For example, 
in the United Kingdom, certain retail banks were offering mortgages based on 120% of annual 
gross salary and there was a significant increase in the buy-to-let mortgage market. In conjunction 
with very low costs of borrowing, there appears to have been a lax approach in determining a 
consumer’s ability to repay. The resulting higher risk mortgages were packaged into securitised 
sub-prime debt products and the associated risks transferred to the investors. The increasing 
demand from the financial markets could only be satisfied through the granting of the underlying 
mortgages in the first instance within the retail sector. Thereby creating links between separate 
parts of the financial system – the retail banks issuing the mortgages, the investment banks 
repackaging the underlying debt into securitised products and the investors in the secondary 
markets buying said products from across the globe. Brunnermeier (2009, p.78) highlights the 
problem as follows: 
 
“The traditional banking model, in which issuing banks hold loans until they are 
repaid, was replaced by the originate and distribute banking model, in which loans 
are pooled, tranched and then resold via securitisation. The creation of new securities 
facilitated the large capital inflows from abroad.” 
 
 
 
 - 8 - 
1.3.2 Funding Operations 
Financial institutions issuing loans for mortgages require access to appropriate funding as do the 
financial institutions investing in the related securitised debt products. This can be achieved 
through external borrowing of varying maturity. If borrowing costs are low, there is a propensity 
for shorter term borrowing which can involve the issuance of asset backed securities, commercial 
paper and medium-term notes in the money markets in return for cash. Such securities have 
maturities varying from one month to one year but financial institutions may also borrow on an 
overnight, weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis through the inter-bank sector of the money 
markets. Furthermore, investment banks may finance their activities through the repo3 markets. 
According to Brunnermeier (2009), in the seven years leading up to the crisis, there was a doubling 
in the fraction of total investment banks financed by overnight repo instruments. Clearly, whatever 
the nature of the underlying security issuance in the money markets, linkages are created through 
the pool of investors willing to buy the said securities and the issuers with the funding 
requirements. Furthermore, there are linkages created between the retail banks and their customers 
in relation to funding – whereby funds are deposited by them into bank and building society interest 
bearing deposit accounts. The common factor across funding sources is their short-term maturity 
– the money market borrowings and issued securities require frequent refinancing and the retail 
banking customers can withdraw their deposits with minimum notice. A liquidity crisis across the 
financial system can arise in the event that the available funding pool of investors in the money 
markets diminishes and / or when retail banking depositors withdraw funds all at the same time.  
 
 
                                               
3 In a repo contract, a firm borrows money by selling an asset today (usually a T-Bill) and promising to repurchase it 
at a later date for a pre-specified price.  
 - 9 - 
1.4 Consequences of the Interlinkages 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) highlight the increasing occurrence of sub-prime mortgage 
defaults from as early as February 2007, resulting in rating downgrades of certain sub-prime 
products by Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. In addition, the mortgage issuers began 
recording significant losses on delinquency and defaults. A natural consequence was growing 
negative sentiment and concern over the true intrinsic value of the structured sub-prime debt 
products and decline in their market prices. For the investors, this meant a reduction in the value 
of assets on balance sheets and overall decline in net worth. This impact is presented by Duarte 
and Eisenbach (2015), where they refer to fire-sale spillovers and externalities. It is suggested that, 
in order to control leverage ratios, financial institutions had to sell off portions of their assets at 
the reduced market prices. The asset sell-off amounted to a “fire-sale” and the negative signals 
sent to the market acted as a catalyst for more and more institutions to sell off their devalued 
structured products – resulting in a loss spiral affecting many market participants.  
The aforementioned declining asset values created issues with liquidity due to the impact on the 
leverage ratio. Indeed, Shleifer and Vishny (2011) allude to the rising ratios affecting the ability 
to raise new funds and refinance existing borrowing commitments through the money markets. 
Furthermore, banks often received overnight funding through collateral backed loans – with the 
collateral being the securitised debt products. With the true intrinsic values of the underlying 
securities being difficult to determine, their higher perceived inherent risk and a shrinking investor 
pool, there was even greater tightening in lending policies. Subsequently, financial institutions 
were forced to sell increasing amounts of assets to achieve short term funding goals. It became a 
self-perpetuating vicious circle of events made increasingly worse by the forced selling activity. 
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It is clear that issues around market liquidity and funding were significant in the 2008 crisis. 
Consistent with section 1.3.2 above, Adrian and Shin (2010) suggest that the difficulties arose 
because cheap funding costs in boom periods induce financial institutions to finance themselves 
with short term borrowing where there will be associated refinancing risk. In such a market 
environment, the lending institutions may underestimate risk and their exposures to associated 
losses. During a boom, this may contribute further to excessively rapid credit growth and relatively 
low regulatory capital provisions. In this case, as the financial crisis progressed all participants 
within the financial system were ill prepared for the consequences. In particular, through 
identifying greater risks than first anticipated, lenders either reduced lending or did so at much 
greater cost. Furthermore, other institutions ceased lending altogether. The latter is referred to by 
Brunnermeier (2009) as a hoarding externality. It reflects the concern that the lending banks had 
about strains on their own internal funding sources. Potentially, they could also require short term 
borrowing through the inter-bank markets. Given the uncertainty over availability of funds through 
that channel, it led to precautionary hoarding by the lending banks in order to fund their own 
operations in the short term. Subsequently, the liquidity spiral worsened with the shrinking appetite 
for new and refinanced issues of commercial paper and medium-term notes but also the short 
supply of funding on an overnight to monthly basis. The worst-case scenario was illustrated by 
Lehman Brothers, when, on September 15th 2008, the investment bank was declared bankrupt. 
Likewise, numerous other struggling banks were bailed out by respective governments, following 
their inability to lock in funding sources. 
 
From a retail banking perspective, institutions were not only impacted by the lack of liquidity in 
the money markets but also through their retail customer base. As presented in section 1.3.2, the 
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minimal notice period for withdrawals implies that if large numbers of customers wish to make 
withdrawals at the same time, there is a situation known as a bank run. This is what occurred in 
the case of Northern Rock in September 2007 – depositors converged on the bank’s branches to 
withdraw their funds and the bank had insufficient cash to pay all withdrawal demands. The 
catalyst for the bank run was the media hype created by Northern Rock approaching the Bank of 
England for a short-term loan facility given its inability to source funding through the usual 
channels. Kaufman and Scott (2003) identify the issues this kind of failure creates within the 
financial system due to banks being interlinked financially. They lend to and borrow from each 
other through the inter-bank markets and if one bank defaults on its obligations to another, the 
latter is also then unable to meet its own obligations to other banks in the chain. What you see 
unfold is a domino effect of defaulting financial institutions.  
 
1.5 Research Objectives and Contribution 
Following the above discussion, it is clear that financial failures can be both localised and 
widespread in nature. The latter is a characteristic of spreading and risk contagion, the degree of 
severity being determined by respective links between the participants within the financial system. 
In practice, within industry, the concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR)4 is widely used by individual 
institutions to measure their exposures to systemic risk, possibly because it is simple enough to 
apply. There are a number of ways to derive VaR – some involving the estimation of conditional 
volatility using ARCH and GARCH methodologies. It is apparent that such techniques are not 
favoured within industry because they are not well understood and do not result in transparency in 
risk management across the financials’ sector.  A method proposed by RiskMetrics is widely used 
                                               
4 maximum loss incurred by a single institution over a given horizon at a given confidence level 
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and its outputs lead to the setting aside of adequate regulatory capital to protect against insolvency. 
Given the indicated importance of correlations, inter-linkages and influences of financial 
institutions on each other, I suggest that it is inappropriate to quantify an institution’s regulatory 
requirements based solely on its own individual VaR. Rather, the negative risk spillover effects of 
all institutions on the entire financial system should be considered. Furthermore, if current industry 
VaR measures do not adequately capture the potential severity of the exposure to systemic risk, is 
there a viable alternative which considers factors that are regarded as highly influential in the 
degree of spread? For example, the falling liquidity in the money markets as identified previously.  
Through this thesis, the intention is not to assess the respective advantages, disadvantages and 
applicability of the various ways to measure VaR. Rather, I aim to provide evidence to suggest 
that linkages need to be incorporated in any method. Furthermore, for this research to be of any 
use in practice, the suggested method must be capable of widespread application in industry. In 
gathering that evidence, I begin with a review of existing research in relation to the measurement 
of systemic risk and encompassing the key themes. Within this review, the VaR concept is 
discussed and one technique incorporating the impact of individual institutions on others is 
presented, namely CoVaR. In chapter 3, I not only add to the existing studies in relation to the 
application of CoVaR to UK and European data sets but, more importantly, illustrate the need to 
apply the technique across sub-groups of institutional investors. In particular, I aim to assess the 
impact of the insurance sector on the wider financial system – currently, literature suggests an 
emphasis on the impact of banks with an absence of data analysis in relation to insurance 
companies. Furthermore, in highlighting the importance of incorporating risk linkages in VaR, I 
proceed to provide further evidence through the application of the Absorption Ratio to the same 
data set. According to Kritzman et al (2010), it captures the extent to which markets are tightly 
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linked and connected and, thereby indicates the more widespread implications of negative shocks 
to the markets.  
A final objective is to identify an appropriate alternative approach to measuring VaR. Accordingly, 
through the literature review, I initially identify key factors in relation to their impact on risk 
spreading. Furthermore, according to certain themes and approaches discussed in relation to 
measurement of systemic risk, the application of network analysis is discussed. I thereby construct 
a Bayesian Network, comprised of two factors and model their impact on the returns of three UK 
banking stocks and related portfolio. The specification allows the production of simulated returns 
and subsequent estimation of quantiles relevant to VaR. In comparing such quantiles to those 
relating to the actual time series of returns, I assess the viability of application of the network 
model in practice. The subsequent contribution of the Bayesian Network is to produce a workable 
method that could be used in industry and which could also be altered to incorporate different 
factors. 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 presents the literature relevant to the pre-defined research objectives and subsequent 
empirical analysis. The application of the Delta Co-VaR model to a given data set is presented in 
chapter 3 and the use of the Absorption Ratio is subsequently reflected in chapter 4 – the latter 
deemed to support the importance of considering financial interlinkages and coupling between 
financial institutions. Finally, a viable alternative modelling approach to VaR is presented in 
chapter 5, along with the empirical application of the model to a given data set.  
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2 Measuring Systemic Risk – Relevant Literature 
The need to determine a suitable and practical measure of systemic risk, which can subsequently 
be applied in regulating financial institutions, is clearly defined in chapter 1. Should the latter 
become overly exposed and take on excessive risks, their failure can lead to expensive losses for 
creditors and the taxpayer through bailouts. Furthermore, the losses may not be isolated to the 
financials’ sector but spread across many sectors as the wider economy begins to suffer. 
Theoretically, several concepts are suggested - some providing a means to simply monitor 
systemic risk and signal pending crises, others providing means to substantively measure 
exposures to it. This section presents a review of relevant literature in this area, with more specific 
focus provided in chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
 
2.1 Monitoring Systemic Risk  
2.1.1 Early Warning Mechanisms 
Certain studies refer to “early warning” mechanisms – whereby, following imbalances in factors 
assumed within the model, the subsequent stability of the financial system is questioned. If such 
imbalances are deemed to be significant in the run up to a crisis, they can be used to signal the 
need for increased regulatory capital in the intervening period. Factors can relate to macro-
economic indicators, such as growth in GDP, market liquidity indicators or, for example, rising 
and unsustainable levels of consumer debt, house price bubbles and rising levels of mortgage 
delinquencies.  
For instance, Borio and Drehmann (2009b) incorporate property and equity prices from North 
America to provide evidence that unusually rapid growth in credit and asset prices can be early 
warning signals of the occurrence of imminent financial distress. Consistent with this is the work 
 - 16 - 
of Alessi and Detken (2009), who combine both economic data, such as GDP and the CPI, with 
financial variables, such as house price growth, to predict boom and boost cycles in the housing 
market as opposed to the financial system per se. Contrary to this, Alfaro and Drehmann (2009), 
illustrate the use of macro-economic indicators as being less useful. Indeed, in their investigations 
of historical banking crises, they find that a large proportion of them are not actually preceded by 
weak domestic macroeconomic conditions in relation to actual and forecast GDP figures.  
The impact of the housing market in propagating the wider financial crisis is further explored by 
Khandani et al (2009), who illustrate that the boom in housing prices, very low interest rates and 
high levels of remortgaging lead to an untenable pressure on the lending institutions in the event 
of a small drop in house prices or rising mortgage delinquencies. Indeed, with regards consumer 
debt and related delinquencies, Khandani et al (2010) use credit bureau data for a sample of US 
commercial banking customers to generate out-of-sample forecasts of consumer delinquencies and 
defaults. They identify declining creditworthiness factors as having useful applications in relation 
to forecasting financial crises. Lastly, from a market perspective, given the suggested importance 
of liquidity, Hu et al (2010) examine the “noise” in US Treasury Yield curves and find that 
increased noise is indicative of capital being in short supply, signaling a liquidity crisis and 
possible broader financial crisis 
Aside from early warning mechanisms linked to economic or financial data sets, there are those 
that focus on financial firm characteristics or on certain asset classes within the broader financial 
markets. For instance, Huang et al (2009b) present the Distressed Insurance Premium (DIP), where 
the latter refers to a risk metric denoted by a bank’s defaulted debt as a proportion of its total 
liabilities. Using a hypothetical debt portfolio for a selection of banks, they illustrate a sharp rise 
in the DIP from early summer of 2007 and then a subsequent decline following a series of bank 
 - 17 - 
bailouts in the following year, consistent with the ideal of a pre-emptive indicator of systemic risk. 
With regards specific asset classes, certain empiricists focus on the impact of hedge funds on 
systemic risk. For example, Chan et al (2005) highlight that, given the higher degrees of illiquidity 
in their chosen investment portfolios, an increase in that exposure can be used as an indicator of 
increasing systemic risk in the wider market. Subsequently, Bisias et al (2012) suggest application 
of this approach to data pre and post financial crisis.  
 
2.1.2 Simulation and Stress Testing 
Rather than providing evidence of early warning indicators, factors identified as being systemically 
important can be applied to model potential losses resulting from a worsening in such factors but 
also respective resilience to them. Consequently, information can then assist in the setting of 
regulatory capital requirements. For instance, network analysis can be applied to identify a network 
of institutions and their linkages within the interbank markets whereby the consequences of a 
failing institution within that environment can be very serious and lead to transmissions of liquidity 
issues across the wider network (see Chan-Lau et al 2009). In essence, certain credit scenarios are 
being simulated, in particular, those relating to the inability to replace or raise funding through the 
inter-bank markets and specific research in this area is highlighted in chapter 5. 
 
2.1.3 Measuring Interlinkages and Coupling Between Financial Institutions 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and Granger Causality tests can be applied to assess the 
degrees of interconnectedness and interlinkages between financial institutions. The consensus is 
that increases in systemic risk are a consequence of those connections. In relation to PCA, which 
applies correlations between asset returns, Billio et al (2010) indicate that the first principal 
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component explains over 90% of the variability in the returns across all of their selected assets 
during times of financial distress. Thereby illustrating how closely they are connected if influenced 
by the same component -  further detailed analysis is provided in chapter 5. With regards Granger 
Causality (1969), Billio et al (2012, pp.66) indicate that “a variable X is said to cause Y if past 
values of X contain information that helps predict Y above and beyond the information contained 
in past values of Y alone.” The variables in this instance refer to returns’ time series of 25 financial 
institutions and the authors assess the number of them that are deemed to “Granger-Cause” or 
directly influence the returns of another financial institution. The higher the number of causal 
relationships, indicates a greater degree of interconnection within the financial system.  
 
2.2 Measurement through Value-at-Risk 
Aside from the monitoring process, when measuring exposure to systemic risk, there are a number 
of methods presented in the literature for quantifying Value-at-Risk. More recently, Kritzman and 
Li (2010) apply Mahalanobis distance5 in the calculation of an institution’s VaR. By considering 
only those returns above a certain value for the statistic, the subsequent VaR is deemed more 
realistic in quantifying maximum losses – essentially, days of low market volatility, represented 
by the smallest values for the statistic, are not considered. In relation to the RiskMetrics approach 
some question the accuracy of this variance-covariance method. Amongst others, Yu et al (2010) 
are critical of the assumed properties of the asset returns – that they follow a conditional normal 
distribution with a zero mean and a variance expressed as an exponentially weighted moving 
average (EWMA) of historical squared returns. Historical observations are assigned a weight, 
where such weights decrease exponentially as we move back through time and, subsequently, the 
                                               
5 Measures the distance of each return in a distribution of returns from the average of the distribution and, in this 
application, extracts the data points with a distance over the 75th percentile.  
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more recent observations carry a higher weighting. Such properties amount to linearity in the asset 
returns and, in reality, given the asymmetric characteristic, volatility structures actually change 
through time and there is clustering. Sollis (2009) consequently suggests that VaR is 
underestimated with the approach – clearly more of an issue during times of crisis.  Indeed, Oanea 
and Anghelache (2015) provide evidence from the Romanian capital markets of the failure of the 
RiskMetrics tool in providing accurate VaR measures relating to the period of the 2008 financial 
crisis.  
Alternatively, ARCH and GARCH models proposed by Engle (1982), Bollerslev (1986) and 
Nelson (1990), indicate ways to estimate volatility, where the deficiencies of EWMA are addressed 
somewhat through assuming changing volatility structures. For instance, with regards the 
asymmetric GARCH (EGARCH) model, it seeks to allow for the differing impacts on asset 
volatility of positive and negative shocks and good and bad news in the markets. Through inclusion 
of a leverage term, EGARCH captures the more pronounced effect of negative asset returns on 
volatility. However, in comparing the volatility outputs using an EWMA approach versus those 
adopting the ARCH / GARCH framework, the conclusions are relatively mixed. For example, 
Hammoudeh et al (2011) find that the GARCH-t model, when applied to commodities markets, 
outperforms EWMA and Degiannakis et al (2011) conclude the same when applying the ARCH 
framework to data before and after the 2008 crisis. Conversely, Ding and Meade (2010) illustrate 
that EWMA volatility forecasts are reliably accurate across a range of volatility scenarios from 
low to high, when applied to data before 2007. It appears that the relative accuracy of RiskMetrics’ 
model is directly related to the degree of volatility during the data period under review.  
When comparing RiskMetrics and the ARCH / GARCH techniques the former is intuitive and 
easily applied in practice. Meanwhile, the latter address certain distributional issues but are not 
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readily applied in industry. Certainly, each of the methods has its advantages but, an obvious flaw 
in each of them is the lack of consideration relating to connections between institutions and how 
risk duly spreads when single entities fall into distress. VaRs at an institutional level do need to be 
measured but, the current outputs per say lead to insufficient regulatory capital being set aside 
because they do not incorporate the impact of the individual institution on the VaR of the entire 
financial system.  However, progressing from the CAViaR model of Engle and Manganelli (1999), 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) do go some way to addressing that issue in suggesting a model 
known as CoVaR (Conditional-Value-at-Risk).  It is conditional because it measures the VaR of 
the financial system conditional on individual institutions being in a state of distress. Whereby, the 
latter is deemed in distress upon reaching its own 1% or 5% VaR. The premise behind this 
approach is, indeed, the capturing of those all-important risk spillovers and contagion as alluded 
to in chapter 1. An adaptation of this model is further illustrated by Girardi and Ergun (2013), who 
apply multivariate GARCH models to historical returns’ distributions to derive CoVaR.  I suggest 
that this model is somewhat of a workable compromise – individual 1% and 5% quantiles can be 
produced from it but also an indication of how systemically important an institution is. Thereby, 
improvements can be made to regulatory capital provisions. A direct assessment of the application 
of CoVaR to European financial institutions is presented in chapter 3. 
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3 Assessing the Impact of Interlinkages on Value-at-Risk 
3.1 Introduction 
The application of Value-at-Risk (VaR) in industry is fundamental to the prevention of excessive 
risk taking and systemic financial failure. However, given the recent high profile institutional 
failures and bank rescue packages, questions have to be asked about the ongoing viability of the 
current VaR methodologies. Those used in practice tend not to incorporate any risk spillovers or 
related linkages and are contemporaneous in nature. One example is as follows: 
 
95% VaR for a 1-day time horizon = value of financial position × (1.65 × '()*+, )6 
where:  represents the conditional variance of returns measured at time t+1 and derived 
on an EWMA basis. 
 
The distribution of returns is assumed to be normal and according to Jorian (1996, p.47), the VaR 
in this case is said to be the expected maximum loss over a 1-day time horizon at a 95% confidence 
level. A more general probabilistic representation of VaR can be defined as: 
    .(/ > 123) ≤ 1 − 6 
Where: L is the loss within a specified time horizon, VaR is the value-at-risk figure, 6 is the 
confidence level (eg. 95% or 0.95). This implies that the probability that the loss will exceed the 
VaR level is less than or equal to 1 minus the confidence level. At a confidence level of 0.95, the 
probability that the loss will exceed the VaR level is less than or equal to 0.05.  
 
                                               
6 Source: RiskMetrics 
€ 
σ t+1
2
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Furthermore, VaR for a single asset can be expressed as: 
        123 = −81 × ( × √:;	 × =(1 − 6) 
Where: NV refers to the notional value of the asset, ( refers to the standard deviation of the asset’s 
daily returns, :; refers to the time horizon and =(1 − 6) refers to the number of standard 
deviations that a given quantile is below a mean value. For example, at a confidence level of beta 
= 95% or 0.95 and (1 − β) = 0.05, alpha would be -1.65. The simplicity of such models facilitates 
their widespread implementation and comprehension – thereby enabling transparency in financial 
risk management. Indeed, a major objective of regulatory control is the achievement of 
transparency across the whole financial system. However, this approach is, perhaps, at the expense 
of accuracy and foresight. 
This chapter attempts to assess and illustrate the importance of considering risk spreading across 
financial institutions in times of crisis. In isolation, an institution may have a low VaR 
measurement for its exposure to systemic risk but a significant negative shock suffered by another 
entity can ultimately have an impact. Should an institution fail, it can amplify the underlying fear 
and panic in the whole financial system and subsequently lead to increases in individual VaR levels 
and further insolvencies. This point is illustrated by a quote from Adam Applegarth, former Chief 
Executive of Northern Rock: 
“The world stopped on August 9th. It’s been astonishing, gob smacking. Look 
across a full range of financial products, across the full geography of the world, 
the entire system has frozen.”7 
 
For each institution within the data set, I attempt to indicate the relationship between their VaR in 
                                               
7 The Telegraph, 16th September 2007 
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isolation and their contribution to the VaR of the whole financial system, where the latter is defined 
by a market index (MSCI Europe Financials Sector Index). This is done for the European 
financials’ sector - a selection of 29 banks and insurance companies across Europe, including the 
UK. Specifically, this is achieved using the methodology proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011) and subsequently by Castro et al (2014), whereby they refer to such an individual 
contribution to systemic risk as Delta-CoVaR. Intuitively, one might suggest that small individual 
VaRs result in small contributions to the VaR of the whole financial system and that the largest 
figures indicate the greatest contribution. Such a relationship is not so clear-cut and I present the 
various anomalies. In addition, as noted by Castro et al. (2014), one institution may actually be 
more systemically important than another. 
The aim of this chapter is not to isolate certain factors relating to any given organization that may 
lead it to be more systemically influential than another. For example, Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011) do not simply use the daily percentage change in security price but rather consideration is 
given to how the markets perceive the changes in value in financial assets over time. More 
specifically, they quantify the daily % change in market valued total financial assets for each 
institution over time – represented by market capitalization multiplied by a leverage ratio (Book 
valued assets: Book valued equity). They argue that focusing on the risk associated with growth 
in market valued total financial assets is directly relevant to risk spillovers. This is because the 
core business of financial institutions is the supply of credit and money supply to the economy. If 
balance sheet assets are not growing or, indeed, shrinking, it signals a stagnation in that supply and 
negative signals with regards economic growth to the markets and, in particular, to the financials’ 
sector. The diminishing balance sheets impact the financial institution but the subsequent negative 
signals impact the wider financial environment. Furthermore, factors such as short-term funding 
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balances are also considered given the liquidity issues faced by banks during the financial crisis 
due to the need to refinance large amounts of money market issues, such as commercial paper.  
As explained in chapter 1, the latter points are clearly fundamental in understanding impacts on 
systemic risk. Indeed, the 2011 paper is of great importance, having been produced within the 
remits of the Federal Reserve Bank. It is subsequently cited on numerous occasions in empirical 
studies in this area. However, the capture of relevant data is a major issue. I consider that, if a VaR 
measure is to be useful to any organization and regulatory body, it must be capable of measuring 
and reacting on a short-term basis i.e. daily, weekly and monthly VaR estimates. At best, financial 
institutions collate balance sheet data on a monthly basis but more commonly every quarter. In 
addition, substantive information on short term funding balances and refinancing requirements is 
certainly not publicly available. Therefore, this chapter adds to the existing literature that applies 
CoVaR methods to market based data. An extension is the inclusion of insurance companies in the 
analysis given their influence as one of the largest institutional investor groups in the financial 
system and their major representation at an individual level within the financials’ sector index. 
Surprisingly, they are rarely considered as systemically important in their own right in existing 
research, with banks being the primary focus. They were also a major influence in the Credit 
Default Swap (CDS) market, a contributing factor to the spread of the 2008 crisis. Indeed, with 
the exception of Billio et al (2010), very few studies incorporate other large institutional investors 
such as insurance companies and pension funds.  
This chapter is divided into several parts. Section 3.2 highlights the recent literature regarding risk 
spillovers in general and then the application of the CoVaR model in various empirical scenarios. 
In addition, I present the developments in regulation in the areas of regulatory capital requirements 
since the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Section 3.3 defines the CoVaR model and specifically how it 
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is used to produce estimates of VaR and Delta-CoVaR. Section 3.4 elaborates on the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) model specification used to generate the time series of returns for input into 
the quantile regression and the methodology for the latter. Section 3.5 describes the data set in this 
context. Section 3.6 presents the VaR and Delta-CoVaR estimations and analysis for the specific 
data set. Section 3.7 details the significance test used to analyse the robustness of the Beta estimates 
defined in section 3.6 for certain institutions of note. Finally, the chapter ends with concluding 
remarks and potential implications for regulatory policy in this area. 
 
3.2 Relevant Literature 
3.2.1 Risk Spillovers 
The notion of risk spillovers and spreading is commonly referred to in many areas of finance and 
economics. Some of the evidence is at a country, market and asset class level (for example the 
Credit Default Swap and hedge fund markets) and does not necessarily relate to the transmission 
of systemic risk per say. However, the studies are still relevant when illustrating the existence of 
any financial linkages. For example, with regards the crude oil markets, Fan et al (2008) reveal a 
significant two-way risk spillover effect between the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent 
Crude Oil markets. More specifically, they state that historical negative returns and subsequent 
VaR measures in the WTI market can be used to predict those in the Brent market. At a country 
level, Asgharian and Nossman (2010) use a stochastic volatility model to analyse risk spillovers 
from the US markets to certain European Equity markets. By way of contrast and referring to 
specific asset classes, Klaus and Rzepkowski (2008) investigate the occurrence among hedge 
funds. They find a significant relationship between redemptions amongst funds and the likelihood 
of ultimate failure of other hedge funds classified within the same investment style.  The use of 
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hedge fund data is further illustrated by Adams, Fuss and Gropp (2010) who suggest that hedge 
funds play a major role in the transmission of negative shocks across asset classes. 
At a financial institution level one particular study by Elyasiani et al (2007) focuses on return 
linkages in addition to risk linkages. They investigate data for US financial institutions over a 10-
year period from 1991 to 2001. Their findings are such that risk and return linkages are significant 
and vary according to the size of the institution. Specifically, the transmission of risk is more 
prominent amongst the larger financial institutions whilst links in returns are found to be most 
prominent in the smaller firms.  This large firm emphasis is consistent with Brunnermeier et al 
(2009) - who suggest that a valid measure of systemic risk can be associated with large and 
interconnected firms that have negative risk spillover effects on other firms. 
Finally, Chan-Lau (2009) investigates risk contagion by measuring default risk co-dependence 
(Co-Risk). More specifically, an assessment is made of how default risk of a specific financial 
institution affects that of another using 25 financial institutions in Europe, Japan and the USA.  
Applying credit default swap data, it is suggested that such co-dependence is strong during times 
of distress in the markets. However, Reongpitya and Rungcharoenkitkul (2010) state that, given 
the underlying data, the latter study only captures credit risk and subsequently suggest the updated 
CoVaR model of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) as a more appropriate approach in assessing 
such financial linkages and measuring exposures to systemic risk. Consequently, this chapter 
depicts the time invariant version of the aforementioned model. 
 
3.2.2 Applications of CoVaR 
The CoVaR concept relates back to the CAViaR model proposed by Engle and Manganelli (1999). 
They are both conditional value-at-risk models, examining the behaviour of returns at quantiles 
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and, subsequently, the application of quantile regressions in their analysis. However, the CAViaR 
approach is an autoregressive one and focuses more on how a quantile changes or updates itself 
over time given a particular set of parameters in the updating process. Unlike the CoVaR, it does 
not consider the risk spillover effects from one institution to the whole financial system whereby 
the “conditional” element refers to the impact on the VaR of the whole system conditional on an 
individual institution being in distress.  Indeed, more recently, Castro and Ferrari (2014) apply 
Delta-CoVaR to compare 26 large European banks in relation to their relative importance with 
regards contributions to systemic risk. In terms of reviewing recent applications of conditional 
VaR models, I focus more on the CoVaR and not the CAViaR concept. 
Rungporn and Rungcharoenkitkul (2010) apply the earlier Brunnermeier (2008) CoVaR model to 
the Thailand Banking system. Specifically, they quantify systemic risk among six Commercial 
Banks for the period 1996 quarter 2 to 2009 quarter 1. Their findings highlight the viability of 
CoVaR during periods of increased and sustained market turbulence, in particular during the 1998 
Asian crisis. During this difficult time, the larger banks are found to contribute more to systemic 
risk. Such results are further evidenced by Arias et al (2010) who confirm that risk co-dependencies 
are highlighted by the CoVaR model also during distress periods but, this time, among Colombian 
financial institutions. Similar to the Thailand and Colombian cases, Fong et al (2009) illustrate that 
there is significant risk interdependence among banks in Hong Kong. However, in the latter case, 
the smaller local banks are found to match their larger international counterparts in terms of 
impacts on systemic risk. Their study ultimately confirms the application of CoVaR as a useful 
tool for analyzing risk interdependencies among financial institutions, albeit with reduced 
emphasis on the previously mentioned size factor in relation to systemic risk contributions. 
An interesting application of the model is offered by Lopez-Espinosa et al (2012) at the IMF 
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Institute. They illustrate the impact of over-reliance on short term funding on systemic risk 
contribution. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, such funding sources are deemed to 
increase interconnectedness between banks and therefore exacerbate financial crises. Specifically, 
for 18 of the largest global banks, their results identify wholesale short term funding as the most 
relevant factor affecting systemic risk. Such a finding warrants further investigation across 
European data sets. However, it is somewhat restricted by the availability of data in relation to a 
financial institution’s ongoing outstanding issues of money market issues and their rollover and 
refinancing dates. The latter are generally refined to an annual record per the published financial 
statements. Despite such limitations, a proxy for the market liquidity factor is considered in chapter 
5 of this thesis. 
 
3.2.3 Regulatory Requirements and the Capital Base 
Given the core product offered by banks and the risk of default attached to said loans, it is 
imperative that they have a large enough buffer of capital to absorb losses. Indeed, the worst-case 
scenario is the risk that the bank’s capital is completely eroded by such losses and it becomes 
insolvent. Should the business activities incorporate exposures to complex credit derivatives or 
securtised products and subsequent underestimated default by the underlying borrowers, tighter 
restriction on the capital requirements becomes a necessity. The inevitable fallout from the global 
financial crisis put intense pressure on the regulators and banking authorities to devise more rigid 
risk assessments and capital requirements for banks and financial institutions. In conjunction with 
the Basel III Accord, the most recent directive in this area is the Capital Requirements Directive 
IV. It represents an initial package of legislation developed and designated by the EU, and 
applicable from January 2014 but with ongoing and evolving reforms and enhancements following 
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industry consultations.  It has the express intention of stating the legal requirements of banks, 
building societies and investment firms in relation to the quality and quantity of their capital base, 
liquidity and leverage requirements, measurement of counterparty risk and additional capital 
buffers. With regards this chapter, the most relevant requirements relate to the capital base and 
additional buffering capital conditional upon the systemic importance of certain institutions (as 
identified by the directive itself).  
The Bank of England (2015) sets out the framework for capital requirements to be in place by 
2019. Some of the detail is already in effect, for example the current minimum equity requirements, 
whereas other parts are being phased in. The minimum equity requirement for all banks is 6% of 
the balance of risk-weighted assets per the balance sheet,8 otherwise referred to as Pillar 1 of Tier 
1 capital. There are also buffers of extra capital that increase the overall Tier 1 capital base to 11%. 
The latter are intended to provide additional protection against bank failure and are an initiative in 
response to the failings encountered in 2008 and 2009. Specifically, according to the Bank of 
England (2015) framework, those buffers are defined in table 3.2.3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8 Source: Bank of England Supplement to the December 2015 Financial Stability Report 
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Table 3.2.3.1: Explanation of Additional Capital Requirement Buffers as specified by the Capital Requirement IV 
Directive9 
Additional Capital 
Requirement (Buffer) 
Reason for the Buffer % of Risk 
Weighted 
Assets 
To be In 
Effect from: 
Capital conservation buffer The buffer to be used to absorb losses 
while keeping the 6% minimum intact 
2.5% phased in 
between 2016 
– 2019 
Countercyclical capital 
buffer 
A time varying buffer to be applied at 
different points in the financial cycle 
depending upon the scale of risk faced by 
the entire financial system 
Time-
varying and 
dependent 
upon the 
scale of the 
risk faced 
2017 
Global systemic 
importance buffer 
Buffer set for those banks identified as 
being globally systemic - to reduce their 
probability of failure or distress 
commensurate with the greater cost their 
failure or distress would have for the 
global financial system and economy 
0% to 2.5% 
for UK 
institutions 
(average of 
1.5%) 
 phased in 
between 2016 
– 2019 
Systemic risk buffer Buffer set for ring-fenced banks and large 
building societies to reduce their 
probability of failure or distress 
commensurate with the greater cost their 
failure or distress would have for the UK 
economy 
0% to 3% 
(average of 
0.5%) 
2019 
 
Interestingly, the authorities do recognize the relevance and impact of systemically important 
banks both to the global financial system and the UK in isolation. Indeed, as at December 2015, 
the Capital Requirement Directive IV identifies those institutions falling within the remit of the 
Global buffer and the Systemic Risk buffer. In terms of the methodology that is applied to identify 
the said institutions, the Delta-CoVaR approach is not used. Following the empirical analysis in 
                                               
9 Source: Bank of England Supplement to the December 2015 Financial Stability Report 
 - 32 - 
this chapter, I compare those institutions from the UK that the analysis identifies as being 
systemically important with those listed in table 3.2.3.2 below.  
Table 3.2.3.2: List of Global and UK systemic risk firms according to the Capital Requirement IV Directive.10 
Globally Systemic Firms (UK)  – Relevant to the 
Global Systemic Importance Buffer 
UK based Systemic Firms – Relevant to the 
Systemic Risk Buffer 
HSBC Holdings Barclays Plc 
Barclays Plc Citigroup Global Markets Limited 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc Credit Suisse International 
Standard Chartered Plc Credit Suisse Investments (UK) 
 Goldman Sachs Group UK Limited 
 HSBC Holdings 
 JP Morgan Capital Holdings Limited 
 Lloyds Banking Group Plc 
 Merrill Lynch International 
 Morgan Stanley International Limited 
 Nationwide Building Society 
 Nomura Europe Holdings Plc 
 Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc 
 Santander UK Plc 
 Standard Chartered Plc 
 UBS Limited 
 
3.3 The Time Invariant CoVaR Approach to Measuring Systemic Risk 
For the purposes of this chapter, we interpret CoVaR as being the measure of the value-at- risk of 
the whole financial system. In line with the concept of contagion, such a VaR is actually 
conditional on the distress of individual institutions – hence the term “conditional value-at-risk.” 
Furthermore, the latter are deemed in distress when they reach and / or breach their own 5% or 1% 
VaR. A further term, Delta-CoVaR, is defined as the marginal contribution of an individual 
institution to the overall system’s VaR. That marginal contribution is deemed to be the difference 
                                               
10 Source: CRD IV updates, Bank of England. 
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between the VaR of the whole financial system when an institution breaches its own 5% or 1% 
VaR and the median state of that institution (i.e. the 50% quantile). That impact on the whole 
financial system for each institution is what is measured and evaluated in this chapter. The quantile 
regression is specified as follows: 
             3)@ = =ABC + 6EBCF̂)C + Ĥ                   (3.1) 
where: “R” refers to the daily returns of the specified market index; 
“r” refers to the daily returns of the financial institution, ‘i’ (denoted by the 
residuals in each case generated by the OLS regression specified in section 
3.4.1). I	is specified as 0.95 or 0.99 in the quantile regression and relates to the said 
quantiles of the market index. In specifying “tau”, we generate the estimated 
alpha and beta coefficients corresponding to the 95% or 99% quantile of the 
returns distribution of the market index.  
 
The aforementioned alpha and beta coefficients are required to determine the systemic risk 
contribution of each financial institution to the overall market and the following specification is 
applied: 																																						∆KL123BMNOPQ|C = S=BC + 6BC123T%C V − S=BC + 6BC123WX%C V            (3.2) 
where: 123T%C refers to the actual observed 1% or 5% quantile of the time 
series of returns of the financial institution, ‘i’; 
 refers to the median state of the individual institution (i.e. the actual 
observed 50% quantile).  
 
VaR50%i
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When tau = 0.95, the Delta-CoVaR measures the % point change in the financial system’s 5% VaR 
when a particular institution reaches its own 1% or 5% VaR11 .When tau = 0.99, the Delta-CoVaR 
measures the % point change in the financial system’s 1% VaR when a particular institution 
reaches its own 1% or 5% VaR. It is clearly dependent on both the institution’s q% VaR and the 
beta coefficient and, consequently, I report them both in the results. Interestingly, a large individual 
institution VaR does not necessarily imply the largest Delta-CoVaR – therefore the requirement to 
identify beta coefficients. 
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) present a methodology for estimating CoVaR and Delta-CoVaR that is 
constant over time and merely applies the historical distributions of the daily returns of the whole 
financial system and each individual financial institution (as represented by the residuals from the 
OLS regression).  The financial system returns are simply the daily percentage change in the 
chosen market index. 
 
3.4 Methodologies 
3.4.1 OLS Model Specification 
Being consistent with Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Castro et al (2014), the objective is to 
identify the impact, if any, of a given financial institution on the wider market. Therefore, a control 
is required for the impact of other variables on each time series. I run a series of OLS regressions 
that provide a control mechanism for possible external factors. Each regression generates a time 
series of residuals and it is those that are applied in the quantile regressions.  The OLS model 
specification is as follows: Y) = = + 6+Z+[\]+6,Z,[\]+6^Z^[\] + H)                  (3.3) 
                                               
11 Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
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where:  Y)	refers to the time series of daily returns for each Financial Institution Z+)_+	refers to the lagged time series of daily returns for the MSCI Europe 
Industrials Sector Index (where the lagging period is 1 day). Z,)_+	refers to the lagged time series of daily returns for the MSCI Europe 
Materials Sector Index (where the lagging period is 1 day). Z^)_+	refers to the lagged time series of daily returns for the Stoxx 50 
volatility index (where the lagging period is 1 day). 
A further two controls are run for potential external factors, denoted by running OLS regressions 
based on t-2 and t-3 lags. If the dependent variable reacts instantaneously to changes in the 
independent variables then the OLS model is relatively static and measures a contemporaneous 
relationship between the returns of the financial institution and the control variables. However, if 
the dependent variable does not react fully and immediately to a change in the independent 
variables, then a lagged rather than a wholly contemporaneous relationship may exist, as depicted 
by Sclove (2013, p.178). 
   Y) = = + 6+Z+[\`+6,Z,[\`+6^Z^[\` + H)                  (3.4) 
  Y) = = + 6+Z+[\a+6,Z,[\a+6^Z^[\a + H)                  (3.5) 
Assessing degrees of significance in the output coefficients in both the contemporaneous and 
lagged cases determines the need to run subsequent quantile regressions using the related residuals. 
If significance is absent or minimal, there is deemed no need to produce Delta-CoVaR figures from 
data sourced at greater lags. 
There is, of course, a potential issue with omitting an unknown but important independent variable. 
While estimating OLS regressions, the error term must be uncorrelated with the explanatory 
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variables and, should there be omitted variable bias, the omitted variable would impact the error 
term. The resulting OLS estimators are, themselves, biased and unreliable. Ordinarily, in the 
absence of running the subsequent quantile regressions, dummy variables could be used to assist 
with this issue.  
 
3.4.2 Quantile Regression 
In evaluating the relationship between two or more variables through ordinary least squares 
regression techniques, an assumption is that any such relation is the same across the entire 
distribution of data – whereas, the effect of one variable on another could actually differ across the 
observed distribution. Quantile regression seeks to overcome this assumption by specifying a 
model that estimates the relation between “X” and “Y” but conditional on quantiles or percentiles 
of Y. As introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978), it evaluates how the relationship changes 
depending on a particular quantile or percentile of the dependent variable. In particular, the slope 
coefficient represents the incremental change in the dependent variable for a one-unit change in 
the independent variable at the predefined quantile of the dependent variable (tau = 0.95 or 0.99 
in this case).  
Any quantile regression can be represented by the following equation: 
    YC = bC6T + cC12                         (3.6) 
where: 6T is the vector of unknown parameters associated with the qth 
quantile. 
 
Accordingly, for different values of “q”, different values for beta are generated.  
                                               
12 Source: Koenker (2005) 
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The OLS regression process minimizes the sum of the squares of the model prediction error i.e. ΣCcC,. Furthermore, the median regression minimizes ΣC|cC|. Subsequently, a quantile regression at 
a particular quantile, q, minimizes the expression in equation (3.7) and thereby accounts for the 
under (f|cC|) and over-predictions ( (1 − f)|cC|) of the model in equation (3.6) for values of the 
dependent variable, Y. 
     ΣCf|cC| + ΣC(1 − f)|cC|                   (3.7) 
 
Using equation (3.6) and substituting in for the error term, we generate the following: 
 
        gS6TV = ΣC:ijkQjlm fnYC − bC6Tn + ΣC:ijoQjlm (1 − f)nYC − bC6Tn                      (3.8) 
  where: 0 < f < 1 and YC is the actual value of Y. 
 
Equation (3.8) is the basis for finding the Beta coefficients at each specified value of q. Essentially, 
they estimate the change in a specified quantile q of the dependent variable y produced by a one-
unit change in the independent variable. In this chapter, the former is specified as the impact on 
the 5% or 1% VaR of the whole financial system. In the empirical analysis, quantile regressions 
are run for the entire sample period, based on residuals generated in the OLS estimations and then 
for two sub-samples – January 1999 to December 2007 and January 2008 to May 2015, thereby 
capturing the market environment pre and post financial crisis. 
 
3.5 Data Set 
3.5.1 Time frames and Data Source 
The data used for the estimations are daily stock returns for 29 large European Banks and Insurance 
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Companies – 16 banks and 13 insurance companies. The full sample covers the period from 4th 
January 1999 to 11th May 2015 and therefore, for each time series there are 4264 observations. 
The two sub-samples cover the periods from January 1999 to December 2007 and January 2008 
to May 2015. All data is taken from Bloomberg and the full sample extends across several periods 
of extended market volatility, the most obvious being between 2007 and 2009.  
 
 
3.5.2 Control Variables and Stock Selection 
In contrast to Castro et al (2014), in defining the market index proxy for the financial system and 
the control variables, I make use of major benchmark indices provided by MSCI as opposed to 
those provided by STOXX. They are the MSCI Europe Financials Sector Index, the MSCI Europe 
Industrials Sector Index and the MSCI Europe Materials Sector Index. In assessing the reliability 
of the data, MSCI are market leaders in the provision of international equity benchmarks to both 
active and passive managers in the asset management industry. A further motive for the use of 
MSCI data is that it does not appear in existing empirical research in this area. However, I do use 
the conventional and widely accepted indicator of volatility in the European markets, namely the 
Euro STOXX 50 Volatility index (VSTOXX). 
 
Euro STOXX 50 Volatility Index 
In North America, there are a number of indices published by the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE) that are subsequently used by investors to gauge the market’s expectation of 
future volatility. For example, the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), the CBOE Nasdaq Volatility 
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Index (VXN) and the CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index (VXO). 13The VIX is the pioneer volatility 
index and measures market expectations of short-term volatility (30-day) as conveyed by the 
implied volatilities of near-dated listed option prices. The relevant listed options are those based 
on the underlying index, the S&P 500. 
A number of volatility indices have developed subsequent to the VIX. The comparatives in Europe 
are VDAX-NEW, VFTSE, VSMI and the VSTOXX. The three former indices reflect the implied 
volatility in the German, UK and Swiss markets as measured by options on the DAX, FTSE100 
and SMI indices. 14With regards the VSTOXX, it measures the market expectations of short-term 
volatility in the European markets in general as indicated by the implied volatility on listed options 
where the underlying is the Euro Stoxx 50 index. The latter index covers 50 stocks from 12 
Eurozone countries, namely, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Despite the underlying index excluding UK 
stocks, the VSTOXX is appropriate in this context as it covers the broadest representation of 
European markets, compared with the other available volatility indices.  
 
Choice of Financial Institutions 
The MSCI Europe Financials Sector Index is comprised of 98 stocks from 15 countries within 
Europe and with diversity in market capitalization from large to medium cap. The top 10 weighted 
institutions in the index are presented in table 3.5.2.1.  
 
 
 
                                               
13 Source: http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix-and-volatility.aspx 
14 Source: https://www.stoxx.com/index-details?symbol=sx5e 
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Table 3.5.2.1: Stock weightings within the Index  
Company Country Weighting in the 
Index 
HSBC Holdings UK 9.6% 
Banco Santander ES 5.2% 
BNP Paribas FR 4.0% 
Allianz DE 4.0% 
UBS CHF 3.8% 
BBVA ES 3.5% 
Lloyds UK 3.4% 
Barclays UK 3.2% 
Prudential UK 2.8% 
ING Groep NL 2.7% 
 Total 42.2% 
 Source: msci.com 
The data set, comprising 29 stocks, contains all of the top 10 constituents of the market index to 
ensure that the largest weighted stocks in the index are represented. Given that my sample contains 
just 29 stocks of the 98 in the index, at the very least, I have chosen the top 10 weights and then 
spread the remaining 57.8% across a broad representation of European countries and their 
respective financial stocks. With regards the sample of stocks selected by Castro et al (2014), they 
include only banks, and exclude three insurance companies (Allianz, Prudential and AXA) that 
actually have large weightings in the STOXX Europe 600 Financials Index. Furthermore, that 
index contains 139 stocks and their sample comprises just 26. In using the MSCI index as a proxy 
for the financial system and my associated stock selection, it could be argued that my sample is a 
fairer representation of the underlying constituents and also respective impacts on the financial 
system. 
 
3.5.3 Data Trends and Visual Description 
Summary statistics for the control variables and the financial institutions are provided in tables 
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3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2. What is clear is that, whilst the mean returns are near zero in each case, the 
maxima and minima indicate large swings in both directions around the mean return. The latter is 
evidenced by the graphs, illustrating the stationarity in each time series and the clustering in 
volatility. Figures 3.5.3.1 to 3.5.3.6 are presented after the summary statistics, with the remainder 
in the appendices – A3.5.3.7 to A3.5.3.29. For all institutions, the largest spikes appear in the 2007-
2009 time-frame – consistent with the most severe period of the recent financial crisis. Following 
2010, volatility appears to stabilise for the UK, Switzerland, Ireland and Belgium. Commerzbank 
and ING Groep exhibit sustained volatility until 2012, along with the French and Spanish banks, 
exhibiting large swings between 2008 and 2012. Furthermore, the Italian, Austrian and Greek 
Banks remain in a volatile state, with no sustained periods of stability since 2008.  
With regards the entire sample period from 1999 to present, the UK institutions exhibit far less 
volatility than the other European markets – perhaps with the exceptions of HSBC and Prudential. 
This is particularly evident during the period from 1999 to 2002, where the UK markets are stable 
relative to their counterparts. However, on the whole, between 2002 and 2007, volatility is fairly 
stable for most of the countries – a time of global prosperity and bullish markets. Across the whole 
sample period, the insurance sector appears to follow the pattern of the respective peaks and 
troughs of the banking sector, with variations in the magnitudes of those peaks and troughs. For 
example, pre-2008, the UK insurance companies appear to have greater peaks and troughs than 
their UK banking counterparts. 
In order to assess dependencies in the returns’ data, autocorrelation functions are produced for 
each data set. A sample of the plots are presented in figures 3.5.3.7 to 3.5.3.11 – on the whole, 
correlations are found not to be an issue and not affecting chosen bootstrapping methodologies. 
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Table 3.5.3.1: Summary statistics – financial institutions – whole sample. 
Company Sector Country No. of Obs. Minimum Maximum Mean 
Aegon Insurance NL 4264 -24.18211 35.27697 -0.00062 
Ageas Insurance BE 4264 -77.57285 29.54545 0.00591 
Allianz Insurance DE 4264 -14.51067 19.49208 0.01005 
Axa Insurance FR 4264 -18.41312 21.86971 0.02959 
Banco 
Santander 
Bank ESP 4264 -14.08932 23.21606 0.03018 
Bank of 
Ireland 
Bank IRE 4264 -54.75687 48.10127 0.02075 
Barclays Bank UK 4264 -24.84642 48.10127 0.02075 
BBV Bank ESP 4264 -13.53532 22.02591 0.01858 
BCO Pop Bank ITL 4264 -16.36472 18.94400 -0.00165 
Commerzbank Bank DE 4264 -24.60901 21.47925 -0.01974 
Credit 
Agricole 
Bank FR 4264 -13.36634 26.31549 0.02715 
Erste Group Bank AUT 4264 -18.10237 18.54032 0.05536 
Generali Insurance ITL 4264 -8.817635 13.10295 0.00131 
Hannover Insurance DE 4264 -18.03541 16.63064 0.04777 
HSBC Bank UK 4264 -18.77876 15.51481 0.02209 
ING Groep Bank NL 4264 -27.48387 29.24331 0.03708 
KBC Group Bank BE 4264 -24.92147 49.90664 0.04316 
Legal & 
General 
Insurance UK 4264 -28.87701 27.50716 0.04056 
Lloyds Bank UK 4264 -33.94800 50.34540 0.00770 
Mapfre Insurance ESP 4264 -12.58046 17.56744 0.04135 
Natl Bk of 
Greece 
Bank GRE 4264 -26.77665 29.15473 -0.02967 
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Old Mutual Insurance UK 4264 -21.64203 30.25274 0.04674 
Paribas Bank FR 4264 -17.24304 20.89688 0.04174 
Prudential Insurance UK 4264 -20.00000 23.45679 0.04953 
RBS Bank UK 4264 -66.57061 35.66878 0.01033 
SCOR Insurance FR 4264 -30.39216 20.99976 -0.00463 
Swiss Life Insurance CHF 4264 -20.07416 20.65115 0.00978 
UBS Bank CHF 4264 -17.21393 31.66144 0.01745 
Vienna Insurance AUT 4264 -17.91405 16.47919 0.03898 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5.3.2: Summary statistics – Market Index and Control Variables – whole sample. 
Variable No. of Obs. Minimum Maximum Mean Return 
MSCI Europe Financials 
Sector Index 
4264 -9.844642 16.039919 0.007582 
MSCI Europe Materials 
Sector Index 
4264 -11.95772 13.44137 0.03426 
MSCI Europe Industrials 
Sector Index 
4264 -9.27486 10.74250 0.02750 
Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility 
Index (VSTOXX) 
4264 -22.0524 63.1319 0.16850 
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Figure 3.5.3.1: Time Series of Allianz Returns 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5.3.2: Time Series of Commerzbank Returns 
 
 - 45 - 
Figure 3.5.3.3: Time Series of Hannover Returns  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5.3.4: Time Series of Aegon Returns 
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Figure 3.5.3.5: Time Series of ING Groep Returns 
 
 
Figure 3.5.3.6: Time Series of Barclays Returns 
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Figure 3.5.3.7: Autocorrelation function for MSCI Europe Financials Sector Index Returns. 
 
Figure 3.5.3.8: Autocorrelation function for Aegon Returns. 
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Figure 3.5.3.9: Autocorrelation function for ING Groep Returns. 
 
 
Figure 3.5.3.10: Autocorrelation function for BBVA Returns. 
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Figure 3.5.3.11: Autocorrelation function for BCO Pop Returns. 
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3.6 Results 
3.6.1 OLS Regression Estimations 
It is clear from the coefficient estimators and associated p-values in table 3.6.1.1, that their relative 
significance is sporadic at best. However, 16 out of 29 institutions do exhibit a degree of 
significance at the 1% or 5% level in relation to the control variables – for example, Allianz, AXA, 
Bank of Ireland and Barclays. For the most part, the significant estimators relate to the impact of 
the MSCI Europe Industrials Sector Index and the MSCI Europe Materials Sector Index (Beta 1 
and Beta 2 in equation 3.3) on the returns of each Financial Institution. In just two instances, the 
impact of the Stoxx 50 volatility index is significant. In any event, it is deemed appropriate to 
continue with the quantile regressions based upon the residuals’ time series generated in each OLS 
estimation.  
Conversely, when running the OLS estimations for the control variables at 2 and 3 lags, per tables 
3.6.1.2 and 3.6.1.3, there is very little evidence of any significance – only in 9 cases at 2 lags and 
mostly in relation to the impact of the Stoxx 50 Volatility Index. There are even fewer cases for 
the estimators produced at 3 lags. Consequently, all subsequent quantile regressions are based on 
the contemporaneous state. 
 
3.6.2 Unconditional, Time Invariant CoVaR – Whole Sample 
A tabulated summary of the results is presented in tables 3.6.2.1 and 3.6.2.2. The suggestion that 
the higher an institution’s VaR the greater its contribution to systemic risk, is only partially 
evidenced in the results. 
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Table 3.6.1.1: OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables  
Company Alpha    
Aegon 0.001391 
(0.975) 
0.114432 
(0.12) 
-0.093910 
(0.113) 
-0.011597 
(0.269) 
Ageas 0.01047 
(0.8235) 
-0.13752 
(0.0736) 
0.03553 
(0.5657) 
-0.01188 
(0.2776) 
Allianz 0.006777 
(0.8428) 
0.142025 
(0.0112)* 
-0.070529 
(0.1176) 
0.010651 
(0.1813) 
AXA 0.027426 
(0.50385) 
0.177687 
(0.008)** 
-0.094325 
(0.08126) 
0.002999 
(0.75385) 
Banco 
Santander 
0.028385 
(0.3994) 
0.043560 
(0.4297) 
-0.047084 
(0.2890) 
0.013146 
(0.0941) 
Bank of Ireland 0.023181 
(0.71706) 
0.265249 
(0.0114)* 
-0.241359 
(0.0042)** 
-0.008783 
(0.55586) 
Barclays 0.038346 
(0.4112) 
0.189149 
(0.0134)* 
-0.080548 
(0.1904) 
0.005184 
(0.6336) 
BBVA 0.016216 
(0.6212) 
0.104552 
(0.0518) 
-0.053295 
(0.2180) 
0.007853 
(0.3046) 
Banca Pop -0.011315 
(0.76984) 
0.131969 
(0.0373)* 
0.024907 
0.625209 
0.030947 
(0.0006)** 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
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Table 3.6.1.1 cont’d: OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables 
Company Alpha    
Commerzbank -0.02671 
(0.540297) 
0.27286 
(0.000)** 
-0.11159 
0.052388 
0.01962 
(0.053665) 
Credit 
Agricole 
0.027356 
(0.46) 
0.065336 
(0.281) 
-0.051205 
(0.294) 
-0.001489 
(0.863) 
Erste Group 0.047631 
(0.23175) 
0.186733 
(0.004)** 
0.003184 
(0.95164) 
0.014896 
(0.10867) 
Generali 0.000112 
(0.997) 
0.02408 
(0.579) 
0.00154 
(0.965) 
0.00287 
(0.642) 
Hannover 0.04594 
(0.1604) 
0.10301 
(0.0547) 
-0.0666 
(0.1226) 
0.007615 
(0.3182) 
HSBC 0.019704 
(0.4623) 
0.08682 
(0.048)* 
-0.07662 
(0.0302)* 
0.015633 
(0.0124)* 
ING 0.032431 
(0.481) 
0.105565 
(0.162) 
0.024067 
(0.692) 
0.005565 
(0.604) 
KBC Group 0.03399 
(0.4697) 
0.11808 
(0.1252) 
0.07283 
(0.2400) 
0.02054 
(0.0609) 
Legal & 
General 
0.038113 
(0.319) 
0.094023 
(0.134) 
-0.043344 
(0.390) 
0.008039 
(0.368) 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
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Table 3.6.1.1 cont’d: OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables 
Company Alpha    
Lloyds 0.009314 
(0.8394) 
0.158067 
(0.0358)* 
-0.140506 
(0.0204)* 
-0.006919 
(0.5184) 
Mapfre 0.045239 
(0.16826) 
0.101214 
(0.05986) 
-0.137252 
(0.0015)** 
-0.011808 
(0.12292) 
National Bk of 
Greece 
-0.03088 
(0.588) 
0.01965 
(0.833) 
0.10193 
(0.175) 
-0.01674 
(0.208) 
Old Mutual 0.0456461 
(0.236) 
0.0122964 
(0.845) 
0.00002 
(1.0000) 
0.0045115 
(0.615) 
Paribas 0.039746 
(0.2885) 
0.141191 
(0.0214)* 
-0.112949 
(0.0222)* 
0.011774 
(0.1774) 
Prudential 0.049165 
(0.225) 
0.045297 
(0.495) 
-0.015718 
(0.769) 
-0.00203 
(0.830) 
RBS 0.007473 
(0.878244) 
0.294157 
(0.000)** 
-0.194083 
(0.0026)** 
0.008372 
(0.46156) 
SCOR -0.008024 
(0.8363) 
0.257908 
(0.000)** 
-0.130387 
(0.0109)* 
0.004583 
(0.6127) 
Swiss Life 0.005222 
(0.88712) 
0.192829 
(0.001)** 
-0.033096 
(0.49508) 
0.002386 
(0.78089) 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
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Table 3.6.1.1 cont’d: OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables 
Company Alpha    
UBS 0.016565 
(0.6458) 
0.122407 
(0.0382)* 
-0.0617 
(0.1942) 
-0.002179 
(0.7954) 
Vienna 0.035286 
(0.212) 
0.1024928 
(0.0269)* 
0.0222565 
(0.5504) 
0.0007069 
(0.9146) 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
 
 
Table 3.6.1.2 OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables at two lags 
Company Alpha    
Aegon -0.0058 
(0.8975) 
-0.001517 
(0.9836) 
0.055813 
(0.3468) 
0.019701 
(0.0604) 
Ageas 0.006146 
(0.896) 
0.015646 
(0.839) 
0.029084 
(0.638) 
-0.009522 
(0.384) 
Allianz 0.011865 
(0.729) 
0.040725 
(0.467) 
-0.059167 
(0.19) 
-0.005486 
(0.491) 
AXA 0.000314 
(0.444) 
-0.000347 
(0.605) 
-0.00026 
(0.630) 
-0.000362 
(0.997) 
Banco 
Santander 
0.028834 
(0.392) 
-0.028121 
(0.610) 
0.016244 
(0.715) 
0.009155 
(0.244) 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
 
β1 β2 β3
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Table 3.6.1.2 cont’d OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables at two lags 
Company Alpha    
Bank of Ireland 0.006348 
(0.9208) 
0.144857 
(0.1662) 
0.133726 
(0.1124) 
0.035529 
(0.0171)* 
Barclays 0.04061 
(0.384) 
0.08117 
(0.289) 
-0.07913 
(0.199) 
0.00884 
(0.417) 
BBVA 0.015892 
(0.6281) 
-0.020113 
(0.7082) 
0.026081 
(0.5466) 
0.013875 
(0.0697) 
Banca Pop -0.010426 
(0.78751) 
0.079336 
(0.21053) 
0.067088 
(0.18846) 
0.025870 
(0.0041)** 
Commerzbank -0.02589 
(0.553) 
0.16151 
(0.024)* 
-0.02889 
(0.616) 
0.01625 
(0.111) 
Credit 
Agricole 
0.024815 
(0.503) 
0.072716 
(0.230) 
-0.057205 
(0.241) 
0.013434 
(0.119) 
Erste Group 0.050747 
(0.2036) 
0.083379 
(0.2022) 
-0.050698 
(0.3355) 
0.023865 
(0.0104)* 
Generali -0.001570 
(0.9527) 
0.005717 
(0.8952) 
0.022481 
(0.5198) 
0.01160 
(0.0603) 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
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Table 3.6.1.2 cont’d OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables at two lags 
Company Alpha    
Hannover 0.045525 
(0.164) 
0.083706 
(0.118) 
-0.045290 
(0.294) 
0.008832 
(0.247) 
HSBC 0.020705 
(0.441) 
-0.035964 
(0.413) 
0.038771 
(0.273) 
0.006245 
(0.318) 
ING 0.03232 
(0.483) 
0.08665 
(0.251) 
-0.03113 
(0.609) 
0.02038 
(0.058) 
KBC Group 0.036931 
(0.4328) 
0.055282 
(0.4734) 
-0.001824 
(0.9766) 
0.028218 
(0.0102)* 
Legal & 
General 
0.040105 
(0.295) 
0.012202 
(0.846) 
-0.020411 
(0.686) 
0.004753 
(0.594) 
Lloyds 0.008774 
(0.849) 
-0.020566 
(0.785) 
-0.030749 
(0.612) 
0.002934 
(0.784) 
Mapfre 0.038547 
(0.2405) 
-0.071962 
(0.1810) 
0.070186 
(0.1052) 
0.014092 
(0.0657) 
National Bk of 
Greece 
-0.03534 
(0.5363) 
0.10365 
(0.2682) 
-0.04838 
(0.5209) 
0.02641 
(0.0475)* 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
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Table 3.6.1.2 cont’d OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables at two lags 
Company Alpha    
Old Mutual 0.047401 
(0.2179) 
-0.125271 
(0.0469)* 
0.073184 
(0.1492) 
0.001577 
(0.8604) 
Paribas 0.039801 
(0.288) 
-0.012202 
(0.842) 
0.011889 
(0.810) 
0.010989 
(0.208) 
Prudential 0.048962 
(0.227) 
-0.006636 
(0.920) 
-0.017643 
(0.741) 
0.007840 
(0.406) 
RBS 0.010093 
(0.836) 
0.070283 
(0.38) 
-0.076828 
(0.233) 
0.005303 
(0.641) 
SCOR -0.007814 
(0.841) 
0.080800 
(0.205) 
-0.034973 
(0.496) 
0.012799 
(0.159) 
Swiss Life 0.008338 
(0.821) 
0.088199 
(0.145) 
-0.036264 
(0.456) 
0.001677 
(0.846) 
UBS 0.01550 
(0.6671) 
0.07181 
(0.2238) 
-0.07725 
(0.1041) 
0.01524 
(0.0696) 
Vienna 0.039525 
(0.16345) 
0.117721 
(0.01130)* 
-0.102791 
(0.00602)** 
-0.001690 
(0.79828) 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
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Table 3.6.1.3 OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables at three lags 
Company Alpha    
Aegon 0.003464 
(0.939) 
-0.023433 
(0.750) 
-0.062042 
(0.296) 
-0.008030 
(0.444) 
Ageas 0.003816 
(0.935) 
-0.075981 
(0.323) 
0.038193 
(0.537) 
0.016739 
(0.126) 
Allianz 0.009768 
(0.775) 
0.058413 
(0.297) 
-0.062118 
(0.168) 
0.004626 
(0.562) 
AXA 0.034620 
(0.399) 
-0.052574 
(0.434) 
-0.066118 
(0.222) 
-0.008193 
(0.392) 
Banco 
Santander 
0.032224 
(0.339) 
-0.025031 
(0.650) 
-0.036290 
(0.414) 
-0.000914 
(0.907) 
Bank of Ireland 0.01157 
(0.8565) 
0.02481 
(0.8129) 
0.10419 
(0.2170) 
0.02933 
(0.0494)* 
Barclays 0.041233 
(0.377) 
-0.030944 
(0.686) 
-0.002688 
(0.965) 
0.007876 
(0.469) 
BBVA 0.019326 
(0.556) 
-0.035498 
(0.509) 
-0.003251 
(0.940) 
0.001886 
(0.805) 
Banca Pop -0.003283 
(0.932) 
-0.023918 
(0.706) 
0.032487 
(0.525) 
0.006938 
(0.443) 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
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Table 3.6.1.3 cont’d OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables at three lags 
Company Alpha    
Commerzbank -0.022570 
(0.606) 
0.014088 
(0.844) 
0.001468 
(0.980) 
0.014018 
(0.169) 
Credit 
Agricole 
0.026073 
(0.481) 
0.044145 
(0.466) 
-0.066237 
(0.175) 
0.012307 
(0.154) 
Erste Group 0.054249 
(0.174) 
-0.062699 
(0.338) 
0.025913 
(0.623) 
0.011307 
(0.225) 
Generali 0.002233 
(0.933) 
-0.009121 
(0.834) 
-0.008669 
(0.804) 
-0.002269 
(0.713) 
Hannover 0.047030 
(0.151) 
-0.021721 
(0.685) 
0.002587 
(0.952) 
0.007236 
(0.343) 
 
HSBC 0.023617 
(0.379) 
0.002367 
(0.957) 
-0.035781 
(0.312) 
-0.002271 
(0.717) 
ING 0.0412868 
(0.370) 
-0.036706 
(0.626) 
-0.0965507 
(0.112) 
0.0001082 
(0.992) 
KBC Group 0.03540 
(0.45211) 
0.05473 
(0.47781) 
0.03486 
(0.57449) 
0.02992 
(0.00643)** 
Legal & 
General 
0.040551 
(0.2891) 
0.074481 
(0.2345) 
-0.097108 
(0.0543) 
0.007334 
(0.4109) 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
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Table 3.6.1.3 cont’d OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables at three lags 
Company Alpha    
Lloyds 0.006963 
(0.880) 
-0.070351 
(0.350) 
0.054875 
(0.366) 
0.004622 
(0.666) 
Mapfre 0.037971 
(0.2478) 
-0.038521 
(0.4741) 
0.088443 
(0.0413)* 
0.008509 
(0.2667) 
National Bk of 
Greece 
-0.03358 
(0.557) 
-0.00964 
(0.918) 
0.03342 
(0.658) 
0.01781 
(0.182) 
Old Mutual 0.040551 
(0.2891) 
0.074481 
(0.2345) 
-0.097108 
(0.0543) 
0.007334 
(0.4109) 
Paribas 0.044147 
(0.238) 
-0.049804 
(0.416) 
-0.040260 
(0.415) 
0.001656 
(0.849) 
Prudential 0.053840 
(0.183) 
-0.091832 
(0.166) 
-0.036854 
(0.490) 
-0.003505 
(0.710) 
RBS 0.006961 
(0.8867) 
-0.090140 
(0.2599) 
0.113351 
(0.0785) 
0.011669 
(0.3055) 
SCOR -0.008165 
(0.8339) 
0.106975 
(0.0935) 
-0.054262 
(0.2906) 
0.014438 
(0.1118) 
Swiss Life 0.007480 
(0.839) 
0.011589 
(0.848) 
0.004448 
(0.927) 
0.010773 
(0.211) 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
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Table 3.6.1.3 cont’d OLS Regression Parameters by Financial Institution – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Control Variables at three lags 
Company Alpha    
UBS 0.018396 
(0.610) 
0.013415 
(0.82) 
-0.060070 
(0.206) 
0.004131 
(0.623) 
Vienna 0.036151 
(0.203) 
-0.006219 
(0.894) 
0.040239 
(0.282) 
0.009621 
(0.146) 
Notes: * Denotes coefficient significance at 5% and ** at 1% 
 
Table 3.6.2.1 Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.95 – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Residuals  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.95 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
ING Groep Bank NL -8.47 3 -4.103 1 
Axa Insurance FR -7.41 11 -3.923 2 
Credit Agricole Bank FR -7.03 14 -3.910 3 
BBVA Bank ESP -5.72 23 -3.839 4 
Aegon Insurance NL -8.37 4 -3.742 5 
Paribas Bank FR -6.76 18 -3.721 6 
Generali Insurance ITL -4.84 29 -3.689 7 
Barclays Bank UK -7.67 10 -3.631 8 
HSBC Bank UK -4.92 28 -3.567 9 
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Table 3.6.2.1 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.95 – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Residuals  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.95 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
Banco 
Santander 
Bank ESP -5.72 24 -3.565 10 
UBS Bank CHF -6.49 21 -3.559 11 
Allianz Insurance DE -6.31 22 -3.537 12 
Swiss Life Insurance CHF -7.03 15 -3.391 13 
Prudential Insurance UK -7.06 13 -3.359 14 
Ageas Insurance BE -7.99 6 -3.310 15 
KBC Group Bank BE -8.15 5 -3.273 16 
Legal & 
General 
Insurance UK -6.74 20 -3.219 17 
Commerzbank Bank DE -7.76 9 -3.196 18 
RBS Bank UK -7.77 8 -3.143 19 
Erste Group Bank AUT -7.41 12 -3.124 20 
Lloyds Bank UK -7.78 7 -3.091 21 
Old Mutual Insurance UK -6.76 19 -2.996 22 
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Table 3.6.2.1 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.95 – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Residuals  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.95 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
Banca Pop 
Milano 
Bank ITL -6.86 17 -2.882 23 
Mapfre Insurance ESP -5.46 26 -2.694 24 
Vienna Insurance AUT -5.32 27 -2.575 25 
Hannover Insurance DE -5.63 25 -2.509 26 
Bank of Ireland Bank IRE -11.56 1 -2.265 27 
SCOR Insurance FR -6.87 16 -1.854 28 
Natl Bk of 
Greece 
Bank GRE -10.86 2 -1.685 29 
Notes: the Delta-CoVaR is the impact on the market index VaR in % terms, as measured by	Δ#$%&'()*+,-|) = 01() + 3()%&'4%) 6 −01() + 3()%&'89%) 6, where tau = 0.95 and q is the 1% VaR of the financial institution in this instance. The measures are taken using the 
entire sample period of data and daily returns are used. Although small in % terms, the impact on the net worth of a multi-billion-dollar 
financial system as a whole would not be insignificant. A figure of 4.103% for ING Groep would infer the respective % increase in the 
5% VaR of the whole financial system when a particular institution reaches its own 1% VaR 
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Table 3.6.2.2 Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.99 – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Residuals  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.99 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
Credit Agricole Bank FR -7.03 14 -4.269 1 
Banca Pop 
Milano 
Bank ITL -6.86 17 -4.144 2 
Allianz Insurance DE -6.31 22 -4.049 3 
BBVA Bank ESP -5.72 23 -4.000 4 
Generali Insurance ITL -4.84 29 -3.907 5 
ING Groep Bank NL -8.47 3 -3.850 6 
Aegon Insurance NL -8.37 4 -3.794 7 
Banco 
Santander 
Bank ESP -5.72 24 -3.770 8 
Paribas Bank FR -6.76 18 -3.694 9 
Mapfre Insurance ESP -5.46 26 -3.641 10 
UBS Bank CHF -6.49 21 -3.640 11 
Axa Insurance FR -7.41 11 -3.617 12 
HSBC Bank UK -4.92 28 -3.578 13 
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Table 3.6.2.2 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.99 – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Residuals  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.99 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
Legal and 
General 
Insurance UK -6.74 20 -3.526 14 
Barclays Bank UK -7.67 10 -3.426 15 
Commerzbank Bank UK -7.76 9 -3.413 16 
KBC Group Bank BE -8.15 5 -3.388 17 
Erste Group Bank AUT -7.41 12 -3.382 18 
Prudential Insurance UK -7.06 13 -3.330 19 
Old Mutual Insurance UK -6.76 19 -2.985 20 
RBS Bank UK -7.77 8 -2.938 21 
Ageas Insurance BE -7.99 6 -2.914 22 
Vienna Insurance AUT -5.32 27 -2.899 23 
Swiss Life Insurance CHF -7.03 15 -2.885 24 
Hannover Insurance DE -5.63 25 -2.689 25 
Bank of Ireland Bank IRE -11.56 1 -2.644 26 
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Table 3.6.2.2 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.99 – Whole Sample and Contemporaneous Residuals  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.99 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
Natl Bk of 
Greece 
Bank GRE -10.86 2 -2.506 27 
Lloyds Bank UK -7.78 7 -2.391 28 
SCOR Insurance FR -6.87 16 -2.031 29 
Notes: the Delta-CoVaR is the impact on the market index VaR in % terms, as measured by Δ#$%&'()*+,-|) = 01() + 3()%&'4%) 6 −01() + 3()%&'89%) 6, where tau = 0.99 and q is the 1% VaR of the financial institution in this instance. The measures are taken using the 
entire sample period of data and daily returns are used. Although small in % terms, the impact on the net worth of a multi-billion-dollar 
financial system as a whole would not be insignificant. A figure of 4.27% for Credit Agricole would infer the respective % increase in 
the 1% VaR of the whole financial system when a particular institution reaches its own 1% VaR. 
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For example, National Bank of Greece has the highest 1% VaR but ranks as one of the lowest in 
terms of its Delta-CoVaR at both tau = 0.95 and 0.99. This observation is further evidenced in 
appendices A3.6.2.1 and A3.6.2.2. At tau = 0.95, only Barclays, ING Groep and Aegon rank in 
the top 10 according to both Delta-CoVaR and the institution’s 1% VaR. Bank of Ireland and 
National Bank of Greece have the top two highest 1% VaRs but rank at the bottom in terms of 
Delta-CoVaR. At tau = 0.99, only Aegon and ING Groep rank in the top 10 according to both 
Delta-CoVaR and the institution’s 1% VaR. Once again, Bank of Ireland and National Bank of 
Greece rank close to the bottom despite having the highest 1% VaR figures. 
The actual values of the systemic risk contributions for each institution range from -4.103% to -
1.685% (the impact on the market index VaR in % terms) at tau = 0.95 and from -4.269 to -2.031 
at tau = 0.99.  Compared with Castro et al (2014), certain consistencies are evident. Clearly, the 
sample sizes, data periods and constituent companies do differ. In addition, they split the sample 
into three sub-periods. However, the top 10 contributors in my data for the banks at tau = 0.95 are, 
ING Groep, Credit Agricole, BBVA, Paribas, Barclays, HSBC and Banco Santander. In relation 
to Castro et al (2014), ING Groep, Banco Santander, Paribas and BBVA are also ranked in their 
top 10 in terms of their systemic risk contributions on the full data sample. Neither Barclays or 
HSBC fall within their top 10, being 20th and 15th respectively and they do not include Credit 
Agricole in their sample. Likewise, the insurance sector is not evaluated in their paper but clearly 
does have an impact as evidenced by the presence of AXA, Aegon and Generali in my top 10. In 
terms of an overall country presence, France, the UK, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands are 
prominent.  
Castro et al (2014) do not evaluate their data set at tau = 0.99. However, with regards my data set 
there appears to be a partial shift in the top 10 rankings. Indeed, AXA, Barclays and HSBC drop 
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out of the top 10 and Banca Pop Milano, Allianz and Mapfre move into it. One insurance company 
and two banks are replaced by two insurance companies and one bank. Further highlighting the 
need to consider the systemic impact of the insurance sector. With regards Banca Pop Milano and 
Credit Agricole, they are both cooperative, mutual style banks whose activities were curtailed more 
by the subsequent global economic crisis as opposed to initial exposures to toxic debt. Indeed, 
aside from Unicredito, Italian banks managed to circumvent the huge write-downs on toxic assets 
but post 2010, the country was plunged into recession15. Their lending is driven by the members 
of the cooperative and in times of economic crisis and recession, deposits and lending in the credit 
markets fall.  In terms of country representation, the top 10 rankings are once again dominated by 
Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands, with BBVA, Aegon, Banco Santander, ING Groep and 
Paribas retaining their positions in the top 10 at both tau = 0.95 and 0.99. 
When comparing the top 10 ranked institutions at both levels of tau with table 3.2.3.2, section 
3.2.3, HSBC and Barclays are consistent with the Capital Requirement Directive IV. Clearly, the 
non-UK based institutions will not be listed in the table. With regards RBS and Lloyds, in my data 
analysis, they do not rank in the top 10 at either levels of tau. Indeed, their rankings are 19 and 21 
and 21 and 28 respectively at tau = 0.95 and tau = 0.99. However, RBS is deemed as systemically 
significant at both the global and UK level and Lloyds at the UK level only, according to the 
Directive. There is not an equivalent table for the insurance sector, but as already alluded to, my 
results do indicate their systemic importance, at least at the European and UK level. 
 
 
 
                                               
15 Source: Moody’s press release May 2012. 
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3.6.3 Unconditional, Time Invariant CoVaR – Sub-Samples 
3.6.3.1 Pre-2008 Sample 
With reference to table 3.6.3.1, at tau = 0.95, the range of Delta-CoVaR values is from -3.57% to 
-0.49%, smaller than those for the whole sample. This is consistent with the exclusion of the 
majority of the most volatile period in the markets from the summer of 2007 to the end of 2009. 
As with the full data sample, in terms of the individual institution VaRs, the same conclusion can 
be drawn in so far as a large individual 1% VaR does not imply large systemic contribution to risk.  
For example, BBVA, Generali and UBS  are ranked at numbers 20, 21 and  23 for their individual 
1% VaRs but are all ranked in the top 10 in terms of their Delta-CoVaRs. In terms of the top 10 
ranked institutions, there are similarities with the full data set. ING Groep is once again ranked at 
no. 1 and AXA, BBVA, Generali, Aegon and HSBC are ranked at 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 respectively. 
Credit Agricole, Paribas, Barclays and Banco Santander do not feature in the top 10 in this sub-
sample. There is a greater presence from insurance stocks than banks. 
With reference to table 3.6.3.2, at tau = 0.99, the range of Delta-CoVaR values is from -3.43% to 
-0.39. There is some comparison with the rankings for the sub-sample at tau = 0.95. For instance, 
ING Groep is still ranked first and Generali, Aegon, AXA, HSBC and BBVA remain in the top 
10. However, Barclays, Commerzbank, RBS and Legal and General now move into the top 10. 
There is certainly a greater UK presence than in any of the previous samples at both levels of tau. 
 
3.6.3.2 Post 2007 Sample 
The average 1% VaR for the data set pre-2008 is -5.427% whereas the corresponding figure for 
the post 2007 data set is -8.644%. This clearly has an impact on the magnitude of the subsequent 
Delta-CoVaR figures when compared to those of the full sample and the pre-2008 sub-sample. 
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This indicates a need for regular reflections upon systemic risk contributions given changes in 
volatility in the underlying markets. With reference to table 3.6.3.3, at tau = 0.95, the range in the 
Delta-CoVaRs is from -5.01% to -2.33% and, once again, having a large institution VaR does not 
imply a top 10 ranking in terms of systemic contribution. There remain consistencies in the top 10 
rankings with the full sample, with Banco Santander, ING Groep, HSBC, BBVA, AXA, Aegon, 
Barclays, and Credit Agricole forming part of the top 10. The exceptions are the German stock, 
Allianz and the UK insurance stock, Legal and General. As with the pre-2008 sample, there is a 
greater representation of UK stocks.  
With reference to table 3.6.3.4, at tau = 0.99, the range of Delta-CoVaRs is from -5.87% to -2.68%. 
Thereby, when a financial institution reaches its own 1% VaR it has a larger % impact on the 1% 
VaR of the financial system than on the corresponding 5% VaR. There are some new entrants to 
the top 10 rankings, for example, Banca Pop Milano is ranked first, and KBC Group is ranked at 
number 10. On the whole, though, the same stocks at tau = 0.95 for this sub-sample also form the 
top 10 at tau = 0.99. 
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Table 3.6.3.1 Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.95 – Pre-2008 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.95 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
ING Groep Bank NL -7.17 4 -3.57 1 
Swiss Life Insurance CHF -7.79 1 -3.08 2 
Axa Insurance FR -6.67 5 -2.98 3 
BBVA Bank ESP -4.93 20 -2.96 4 
Generali Insurance ITL -4.79 21 -2.94 5 
Aegon Insurance NL -7.51 3 -2.91 6 
Ageas Insurance BE -6.23 6 -2.89 7 
UBS Bank CHF -4.51 23 -2.83 8 
Allianz Insurance DE -5.94 8 -2.69 9 
HSBC Bank UK -4.31 26 -2.67 10 
Banco 
Santander 
Bank ESP -5.26 15 -2.67 11 
Commerzbank Bank DE -5.79 9 -2.66 12 
Barclays Bank UK -5.26 14 -2.64 13 
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Table 3.6.3.1 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.95 – Pre-2008 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.95 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
Paribas Bank FR -5.09 19 -2.63 14 
RBS Bank UK -5.53 11 -2.55 15 
Prudential Insurance UK -6.16 7 -2.53 16 
Lloyds Bank UK -5.22 17 -2.41 17 
Credit Agricole Bank FR -4.34 24 -2.39 18 
Legal & 
General 
Insurance UK -5.38 12 -2.34 19 
Old Mutual Insurance UK -5.71 10 -2.32 20 
KBC Group Bank BE -4.77 22 -2.31 21 
Hannover Insurance DE -5.28 13 -1.73 22 
Bank of Ireland Bank IRE -5.21 18 -1.61 23 
Banca Pop Bank ITL -4.25 27 -1.49 24 
Bank of Greece Bank GRE -5.26 16 -1.31 25 
SCOR Insurance FR -7.75 2 -1.24 26 
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Table 3.6.3.1 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.95 – Pre-2008 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.95 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
Mapfre Insurance ESP -4.34 25 -1.22 27 
Erste Group Bank AUT -4.03 28 -1.21 28 
Vienna Insurance AUT -2.93 29 -0.49 29 
Notes: Notes: the Delta-CoVaR is the impact on the market index VaR in % terms, as measured by	Δ#$%&'()*+,-|) =01() + 3()%&'4%) 6 − 01() + 3()%&'89%) 6, where tau = 0.95 and q is the 1% VaR of the financial institution in this instance. The measures 
are taken using the pre-2008 sample period of data and daily returns are used. Although small in % terms, the impact on the net worth 
of a multi-billion-dollar financial system as a whole would not be insignificant. A figure of 3.57% for ING Groep would infer the 
respective % increase in the 5% VaR of the whole financial system when a particular institution reaches its own 1% VaR. 
  
 - 74 - 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6.3.2 Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.99 – Pre-2008 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.99 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
ING Groep Bank NL -7.17 4 -3.43 1 
Barclays Bank UK -5.26 14 -3.39 2 
Generali Insurance ITL -4.79 21 -3.34 3 
Commerzbank Bank DE -5.79 9 -3.31 4 
Aegon Insurance NL -7.51 3 -3.18 5 
Axa Insurance FR -6.67 5 -3.01 6 
HSBC Bank UK -4.31 26 -2.97 7 
RBS Bank UK -5.53 11 -2.75 8 
BBVA Bank ESP -4.93 20 -2.74 9 
Legal & 
General 
Insurance UK -5.38 12 -2.71 10 
UBS Bank CHF -4.51 23 -2.71 11 
Ageas Insurance BE -6.23 6 -2.69 12 
Old Mutual Insurance UK -5.71 10 -2.69 13 
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Table 3.6.3.2 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.99 – Pre-2008 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.99 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
Banco 
Santander 
Bank ESP -5.26 15 -2.67 14 
Allianz Insurance DE -5.94 8 -2.58 15 
Lloyds Bank UK -5.22 17 -2.57 16 
Swiss Life Insurance CHF -7.79 1 -2.55 17 
Paribas Bank FR -5.09 19 -2.53 18 
KBC Group Bank BE -4.77 22 -2.44 19 
Prudential Insurance UK -6.16 7 -2.38 20 
Credit Agricole Bank FR -4.34 24 -2.23 21 
Banca Pop  Bank ITL -4.25 27 -2.15 22 
Bank of Ireland Bank IRE -5.21 18 -2.12 23 
Bank of Greece Bank GRE -5.26 16 -1.82 24 
Hannover Insurance DE -5.28 13 -1.74 25 
Erste Group Bank AUT -4.03 28 -1.66 26 
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Table 3.6.3.2 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.99 – Pre-2008 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.99 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
SCOR Insurance FR -7.75 2 -1.20 27 
Mapfre Insurance ESP -4.34 25 -1.20 28 
Vienna Insurance AUT -2.93 29 -0.39 29 
Notes: the Delta-CoVaR is the impact on the market index VaR in % terms, as measured by Δ#$%&'()*+,-|) = 01() + 3()%&'4%) 6 −01() + 3()%&'89%) 6, where tau = 0.99 and q is the 1% VaR of the financial institution in this instance. The measures are taken using the 
pre-2008 sample period of data and daily returns are used. Although small in % terms, the impact on the net worth of a multi-billion-
dollar financial system as a whole would not be insignificant. A figure of 3.43% for ING Groep would infer the respective % increase 
in the 1% VaR of the whole financial system when a particular institution reaches its own 1% VaR. 
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Table 3.6.3.3 Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.95 – Post-2007 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.95 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
Banco 
Santander 
Bank ESP -6.86 20 -5.01 1 
ING Groep Bank NL -10.79 5 -5.00 2 
HSBC Bank UK -5.74 27 -4.84 3 
Allianz Insurance DE -6.65 22 -4.73 4 
BBVA Bank ESP -6.42 25 -4.71 5 
AXA Insurance FR -8.10 17 -4.68 6 
Aegon Insurance NL -9.51 11 -4.56 7 
Legal & 
General 
Insurance UK -8.57 14 -4.53 8 
Barclays Bank UK -10.19 7 -4.51 9 
Credit Agricole Bank FR -8.20 16 -4.47 10 
UBS Bank CHF -8.34 15 -4.45 11 
KBC Group Bank BE -12.16 3 -4.44 12 
Erste Group Bank AUT -9.78 8 -4.36 13 
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Table 3.6.3.3 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.95 – Post-2007 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.95 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
Prudential Insurance UK -8.03 18 -4.32 14 
Paribas Bank FR -7.62 19 -4.29 15 
Old Mutual Insurance UK -9.05 12 -4.28 16 
Generali Insurance ITL -4.84 29 -4.21 17 
Swiss Life Insurance CHF -6.64 23 -4.09 18 
Mapfre Insurance ESP -6.26 26 -4.02 19 
RBS Bank UK -11.06 4 -3.90 20 
Banca Pop 
Milano 
Bank ITL -8.61 13 -3.84 21 
Lloyds Bank UK -10.50 6 -3.80 22 
Commerzbank Bank DE -9.64 10 -3.79 23 
Hannover Insurance DE -6.48 24 -3.63 24 
Vienna Insurance AUT -6.68 21 -3.60 25 
Ageas Insurance BE -9.72 9 -3.57 26 
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Table 3.6.3.3 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.95 – Post 2007 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.95 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
SCOR Insurance FR -5.10 28 -2.99 27 
Bank of Ireland Bank IRE -15.83 1 -2.88 28 
National Bank 
of Greece 
Bank GRE -13.29 2 -2.33 29 
Notes: the Delta-CoVaR is the impact on the market index VaR in % terms, as measured by	Δ#$%&'()*+,-|) = 01() + 3()%&'4%) 6 −01() + 3()%&'89%) 6, where tau = 0.95 and q is the 1% VaR of the financial institution in this instance. The measures are taken using the 
post-2007 sample period of data and daily returns are used. Although small in % terms, the impact on the net worth of a multi-billion-
dollar financial system as a whole would not be insignificant. A figure of 5.01% for Banco Santander would infer the respective % 
increase in the 5% VaR of the whole financial system when a particular institution reaches its own 1% VaR. 
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Table 3.6.3.4 Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.99 – Post-2007 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.99 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
Banca Pop 
Milano 
Bank ITL -8.61 13 -5.87 1 
Banco 
Santander 
Bank ESP -6.86 20 -5.32 2 
BBVA Bank ESP -6.42 25 -5.21 3 
Credit Agricole Bank FR -8.20 16 -5.16 4 
Allianz Insurance DE -6.65 22 -5.15 5 
Generali Insurance ITL -4.84 29 -4.84 6 
ING Groep Bank NL -10.79 5 -4.81 7 
Aegon Insurance NL -9.51 11 -4.75 8 
UBS Bank CHF -8.34 15 -4.73 9 
KBC Group Bank BE -12.16 3 -4.70 10 
Mapfre Insurance ESP -6.26 26 -4.61 11 
Commerzbank Bank DE -9.64 10 -4.59 12 
Erste Group Bank AUT -9.78 8 -4.54 13 
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Table 3.6.3.4 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.99 – Post-2007 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.99 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
HSBC Bank UK -5.74 27 -4.49 14 
Legal & 
General 
Insurance UK -8.57 14 -4.43 15 
Hannover Insurance DE -6.48 24 -4.40 16 
Paribas Bank FR -7.62 19 -4.28 17 
Prudential Insurance UK -8.03 18 -4.24 18 
AXA Insurance FR -8.10 17 -4.14 19 
Vienna Insurance AUT -6.68 21 -3.94 20 
National Bank 
of Greece 
Bank GRE -13.29 2 -3.94 21 
SCOR Insurance FR -5.10 28 -3.84 22 
Barclays Bank UK -10.19 7 -3.82 23 
Old Mutual Insurance UK -9.05 12 -3.82 24 
Bank of Ireland Bank IRE -15.83 1 -3.75 25 
Swiss Life Insurance CHF -6.64 23 -3.74 26 
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Table 3.6.3.4 cont’d Institution 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR at Tau = 0.99 – Post-2007 Sub-Sample  
Company Sector Country Company VaR at 
q = 1% 
Ranking 
According to VaR 
Delta-CoVaR at 
tau = 0.99 
Ranking 
According to 
Delta-CoVaR 
RBS Bank UK -11.06 4 -3.40 27 
Lloyds Bank UK -10.50 6 -3.37 28 
Ageas Insurance BE -9.72 9 -2.68 29 
Notes: the Delta-CoVaR is the impact on the market index VaR in % terms, as measured by Δ#$%&'()*+,-|) = 01() + 3()%&'4%) 6 −01() + 3()%&'89%) 6, where tau = 0.99 and q is the 1% VaR of the financial institution in this instance. The measures are taken using the 
post 2007 sample period of data and daily returns are used. Although small in % terms, the impact on the net worth of a multi-billion-
dollar financial system as a whole would not be insignificant. A figure of 5.87% for Banca Pop Milano would infer the respective % 
increase in the 1% VaR of the whole financial system when a particular institution reaches its own 1% VaR.   
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3.7 Significance of Estimations 
3.7.1 Specification of Significance Tests on the Delta-CoVaR Estimations 
The bootstrapping method is applied to assess the significance of the slope coefficients produced 
in the quantile regression specified in equation (3.1). Its aim is to recreate the population 
distribution of estimators by sampling with replacement from the data sets specified in section 3.5 
above. In this case the sampling process is repeated 200 times in order to create the bootstrap 
distribution of the slope coefficient estimators for both the 5% and 1% cases and this is done for 
each financial institution. P-values are then calculated for each set of bootstrapped output and 
inferences made regarding the significance of the original beta coefficients. 
3.7.2 Results of Significance Tests 
A selection of the graphical distributions of the beta coefficients generated by the resampling 
bootstrap technique are presented in figures 3.7.2.1 and 3.7.2.2. Six institutions having a large 
Delta-CoVaR relative to the entire population of financial institutions are shown – ING Groep, 
AXA, Credit Agricole, BBVA, Aegon, and Paribas. In each chart, the original beta coefficient 
estimate is highlighted. The corresponding P-values of each bootstrapped distribution are 
presented in tables 3.7.2.1 and 3.7.2.2. The latter suggest a lack of significance in the beta 
coefficients across the board. However, given the number of financial institutions within the 
European financials’ sector, you would expect fairly small contributions from each towards the 
VaR of the entire system. That is not to say that they would not be considered as important, given 
that a small shift in that VaR in a multi-billion-dollar industry is significant in financial terms.  
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Figure 3.7.2.1: Histograms of resampled bootstrapped distributions of beta coefficients (where VaR is 1% and tau = 
0.95) – entire sample. The original beta coefficients are denoted by the vertical black line in each case. 
ING Groep 
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Figure 3.7.2.1: Histograms of resampled bootstrapped distributions of beta coefficients (where VaR is 1% and tau = 
0.95) – entire sample. The original beta coefficients are denoted by the vertical black line in each case. 
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Figure 3.7.2.1: Histograms of resampled bootstrapped distributions of beta coefficients (where VaR is 1% and tau = 
0.95) – entire sample. The original beta coefficients are denoted by the vertical black line in each case. 
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Figure 3.7.2.2: Histograms of resampled bootstrapped distributions of beta coefficients (where VaR is 1% and tau = 
0.99) – entire sample. The original beta coefficients are denoted by the vertical black line in each case. 
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 - 88 - 
Figure 3.7.2.2: Histograms of resampled bootstrapped distributions of beta coefficients (where VaR is 1% and tau = 
0.99) – entire sample. The original beta coefficients are denoted by the vertical black line in each case. 
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Figure 3.7.2.2: Histograms of resampled bootstrapped distributions of beta coefficients (where VaR is 1% and tau = 
0.99) – entire sample. The original beta coefficients are denoted by the vertical black line in each case. 
BBVA 
 
 
 
Paribas 
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Table 3.7.2.1: P-Values of the Bootstrapped Distributions at tau = 0.95. 
Company P-Value 
ING Groep 0.52 
AXA 0.50 
Credit Agricole 0.48 
BBVA 0.43 
Aegon 0.44 
Paribas 0.52 
    
Table 3.7.2.2: P-Values of the Bootstrapped Distributions at tau = 0.99. 
Company P-Value 
ING Groep 0.45 
AXA 0.51 
Credit Agricole 0.37 
BBVA 0.45 
Aegon 0.58 
Paribas 0.54 
 
 
 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
At the very least, it is encouraging that some of the findings of this investigation are consistent 
with those of the published paper by Castro and Ferrari (2014). That is, despite the use of a mostly 
different data set and time frame, some of the institutions identified as major contributors are 
consistent in both papers. In the absence of more substantive data in relation to company size and 
regular, informative, balance sheet categories, inferences and implications for regulatory capital 
can still be made. The model itself is intuitive and in this case highlights the importance of 
considering both country of origin and the financial sector in which the financial institution is 
based. Furthermore, consideration should be given to the differing degrees of impact when 
referring to a 1% or 5% financial system VaR – individual institutions ranked outside of the top 
10 at tau of 0.95, fall into it at tau of 0.99. Add to that the need to regularly reflect on systemic risk 
contributions given the changing conditions in the underlying markets – evidenced by the change 
in magnitude in the Delta-CoVaR figures during the 2008 to 2015 data period. 
In recent studies, most do highlight the overall systemic importance of banks and both Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011) and Castro and Ferrari (2014) attempt to rank them relative to each other.  
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However, in both cases, the ranking process does not provide particularly useful information, 
indeed, very few banks can actually be ranked according to their systemic risk contribution on the 
basis of Delta-CoVaR at a particular point in time. This paper does not attempt any kind of 
“modelled” ranking process other than ranking on the basis of the size of the Delta-CoVaR figure, 
but, nevertheless, it does yield important observations in relation to non-bank financial institutions 
and country impacts – neither of which are highlighted by the previously mentioned authors. Given 
the impact of the AIG failure on the financial system, this paper subsequently suggests that greater 
emphasis should be placed on the role of insurance companies in any financial crisis. They are a 
significant institutional player in the markets and I suggest that stricter rules in relation to 
regulatory capital should not appear to be biased towards the banks. Insurance companies generally 
have significant weightings within financial indices and exposures to them should be more 
carefully managed. Perhaps the insurance companies themselves could have a weighting applied 
to their regulatory capital base consistent with their weighting in the primary financial market 
index. The latter could also be considered on a country basis given that the research highlights that 
only a few countries monopolise the top ten Delta-CoVaR figures at both the 5% and 1% levels 
based on the entire sample –  France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, with 2 representatives from 
the UK in the top 10 at tau = 0.95. Furthermore, the Delta-CoVaR comparative method for 
highlighting systemic significance is a statistical tool that regulatory bodies could apply in 
conjunction with their existing scoring methods. The data in this chapter highlights certain 
consistencies in the UK banks deemed to be systemically significant at the global and UK level, 
perhaps, therefore, Delta-CoVaR could be applied as an alternative measure. Although ex-ante, it 
can be applied to data sets with regular updates, unlike the current scoring methods applied in CRD 
IV.
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4 Application of the Absorption Ratio to Illustrate Connectedness and Interlinkages 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 illustrates the importance of considering the impact of risk contagion and interlinkages 
when measuring exposures to systemic risk through VaR. If a financial institution falls into a state 
of distress, Delta-CoVaR identifies the subsequent impact on the whole financial system. Given 
that the distress of a single institution does appear to affect the wider financial system, this is an 
example of risk contagion and spreading. As previously indicated in chapter 1, the latter occurs 
due to interlinkages or interconnectedness within the system. Therefore, in order to substantiate 
the findings in chapter 3, I seek to provide evidence of the connections that exist between financial 
institutions leading to the propagation or spreading in a crisis. This is done through application of 
the Absorption Ratio (AR), as proposed by Kritzman et al (2010). They suggest that this ratio 
captures the existence and extent of any financial linkages and highlight the greater severity of the 
“spreading” effect when the links are strong. Furthermore, a low AR suggests markets are less 
tightly coupled whereas a high ratio suggests the opposite – in the latter case a greater proportion 
of the assets’ returns are explained by a certain number of key components. The analysis is 
performed using ten UK and European stocks, from the banking and insurance sub-sectors and 
constituents of the MSCI financials’ sector index. The data is applied to assess how closely the 
AR follows the path of the relevant market index and whether there is a discernable pattern or 
relationship between the two. Rather than investigating the linkages between all industries within 
a given market index, I am exploring the fragility just of the financials’ sector and thereby focus 
only on the asset returns of financial firms. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents relevant literature in relation to factor 
analysis and, in particular, Principal Components Analysis (PCA), a strand of research 
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incorporating the AR. In addition, I discuss instances of the application of the AR. Within section 
4.3, the data and its characteristics are discussed. The concepts of Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors 
are presented in section 4.4, along with their application in deriving the AR. I present the results 
and inferences in section 4.5 and end with concluding remarks in section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Relevant Literature 
4.2.1 Factor and Principal Components Analysis 
When explaining variations in asset returns or, indeed, economic data sets, factor or Principal 
Component models can be utilised. In either case, ascertaining an appropriate number of factors 
or components is presented in the literature. For example, Connor and Korajczyk (1993), present 
evidence of one to six factors through interpretation of non-zero eigenvalues relating to a sample 
covariance matrix. Most recently, Ivanov et al (2017) identify two factors as capturing 95.4% of 
the variability in a specified set of US stock returns, with 80 to 90% generated from a single factor. 
Likewise, Bai and Ng (2007) suggest the presence of two factors when investigating the variation 
in monthly returns of 8,436 stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ.  Interestingly, 
Hallin and Liska (2007) split their US economic data set into two sub-samples – 1960 to 1982 and 
1983 to 2003. In the former case, three factors are identified and one factor in the later sub-sample 
– both indicating a low number of factors driving the US economy. Consistently, low numbers of 
factors are identified as the key drivers (see Ahn and Horenstein (2013)), perhaps due to the tight 
coupling that exists between markets as a whole and within sectors and perceived increased 
correlations.  
In relation to PCA, it can be described as a method used to identify sets of correlated variables that 
can subsequently be combined linearly into a set of components. In essence, it provides a means 
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to explain correlations between variables (asset returns) through some linear combinations of the 
variables where the latter capture the variability in the original data set.  A key objective of the 
technique is to identify as small a set of components as possible, where the latter also account for 
as much of the variation in the correlated variables as possible. Of all of the components, the first 
one accounts for the most variation in the original variables, the second accounts for the next 
largest amount of variation but which is also uncorrelated with the first component. Subsequent 
components account for less and less variation in a descending manner and none of them correlate 
with any of the preceding components. It is a non-parametric type of analysis where each 
component is assigned an eigenvalue. The largest eigenvalues are attached to those components 
that explain the greatest proportion of the variation in the original variables and they are presented 
in descending order (the largest eigenvalue being associated with principal component number 1).  
 
4.2.1.1 Applications of PCA 
The use of PCA techniques can be found in several areas outside of finance. For instance, within 
genetics they are applied to determine the existence of genetically distinct sub-groups within a 
population set (see Patterson, Price and Reich 2006). Applications in scientific spheres are very 
common, particularly within physics specialisms and medical research. For example, 
understanding the surface properties of asteroids and variations in the degrees of weathering 
amongst asteroids of different size (see Koga et al 2018) or within medical research in 
understanding variations in success rates in lung cancer patients undergoing radiotherapy 
treatments (see Ellsworth et al 2017). Clearly, PCA is applied in a very diverse range of contexts, 
where a recognised advantage is in its ability to analyse large data sets.  
With regards finance, a common application relates to the financial markets. Some research relates 
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to specific asset classes and instruments, for example, applications to yield curves and resulting 
forward curves and variations in their movement through ascertaining components. According to 
Laurini and Ohashi (2015), the application of PCA in this context yields mixed results and is 
deemed to perform more effectively when the correlation matrices are based upon longer term data 
sets. Contrary to this, Barber and Copper (2010) indicate with greater success that PCA isolates 
more than 90% of the total variation in the yield curve for US Treasury Securities. They also 
indicate the ease of application of the technique - the components are “observable” given that they 
are constructed from linear combinations of data, which in itself is observable and clearly defined. 
From a risk management perspective, it is clearly useful to understand the dynamics in the shifts 
and variations of a yield curve.  
When discussing financial crises, the application of PCA is widespread. In several instances, it is 
used to investigate spreading across markets. Upon identifying a prominent component in relation 
to a given region’s returns, it can be applied in a Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model 
to estimate the impact of the dominant component on the returns of a different region.  For 
example, Yiu et al (2010) present a finding of spreading from the US to the Asian markets 
following a shift in the DCC just prior to the start of the 2008 crisis. Similarly, Martinez and 
Ramirez (2010), apply PCA to assess the extent of market reactions across certain Latin American 
countries.  Having identified the first principal component, it is then applied in ARCH-GARCH 
volatility models to analyse volatility across markets in the region – in this instance there is only 
a mild increase in market sensitivities to shocks as opposed to an extreme reaction. In terms of 
markets as a whole, Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) isolate principal components and apply them 
in regressions on various country index returns to assess the degree of integration across 
international markets. The indicator used for inference on this occasion is the R-squared from the 
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regression.  
It appears that the PCA is applied in many cases to first isolate the principal components underlying 
the correlations in returns. Subsequently, the latter are applied in further modelling processes to 
understand the extent and / or existence of risk contagion. However, PCA can also be used in 
simply assessing how well the components explain variation in asset returns during times of 
financial crisis. Billio et al (2012) illustrate that a single component explains a greater proportion 
of the total variation in returns during such crises because firms are tightly coupled during such 
periods. This is consistent with Kritzman et al (2010) in relation to the Absorption Ratio and the 
next section presents relevant literature in the area of PCA and the AR.  
 
4.2.2 Literature in Relation to the Absorption Ratio 
The AR is a relatively recent advancement in approach relating to investigation of interlinkages. 
However, certain studies do apply or extend upon Kritzman et al (2010). An extension is provided 
by Reyngold et al (2015). The latter only include financial firms in their data set and their 
subsequent Credit Absorption Ratio (CAR) incorporates an additional component to reflect the 
risk of failure of the said firms within their data. Their results are broadly consistent in so far as 
the individual financial firm returns tend to be closely linked during times of distress and reflected 
in the higher values of the CAR at such times. Preparation of this ratio is rather data intensive and 
reliant upon accurate measures or proxies for monthly book values of both debt and equity. 
Furthermore, it assumes that debt levels are relatively stable over medium term horizons, when, in 
fact, a characteristic of certain financial institutions prior to the financial crisis was the use of short 
term debt requiring regular refinancing. 
Dumitrescu (2015) applies the ratio in a predictive capacity in relation to an early warning indicator 
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of forthcoming turbulence in the markets of the European Union. Indeed, it is suggested that its 
predictive capacities are actually applied within industry in relation to rebalancing portfolios - if 
the ratio suggests tight coupling amongst assets and increased susceptibility to bad news in the 
broader markets, then rebalance to more defensive asset classes (see Goyal 2014). The latter 
findings are also promoted by the Portfolio Management industry professional body, the CFA, in 
their recent publications (see Kritzman 2014). However, given that individual asset management 
strategies are not a matter of public record, it is difficult to assess the actual extent of its use. In 
applying it to the data in this chapter, at the very least, further evidence is provided in relation to 
its validity in signaling linkages. 
 
4.3 The Data 
As mentioned in section 4.1, in exploring the fragility of the financials’ sector, the focus is just on 
financial stocks across the banking and insurance sub-sectors within Europe. Therefore, the data 
set differs from that of Kritzman et al (2010). The latter apply a market wide index incorporating 
632 stocks across a variety of large and mid-cap US stocks and 51 sub-industries. I incorporate 10 
stocks from within the MSCI Europe Financials’ Sector index where the stocks chosen account for 
over 40% of the weightings of all stocks in the index. There are 900 daily return observations for 
each stock - HSBC Holdings, Banco Santander, Paribas, Allianz, UBS, BBVA, Lloyds, Barclays, 
Prudential, and ING. The market index is the MSCI Europe Financials’ Sector Index and all of the 
daily observations are collected for the period 30th December 2005 to 12th June 2009. This allows 
for incorporating sufficient time periods pre-financial crisis and also the time-frame following the 
crisis when the underlying market index starts to recover – from March 2009. In relation to the 
daily observations for return, it is derived as follows: 
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     !" = $%&$%'($%'(                 (4.1) 
Where:	*" refers to the closing price of the stock or index at time t. *"&+ refers to the closing price of the stock or index at time t-1. !" refers to the daily return of the stock or index at time t. 
 
All data is sourced from Bloomberg and the summary statistics for the stocks and index are 
presented in table 4.3.1. The mean daily return in each case is close to zero and the impact of the 
2008 crisis is reflected in the minimum return values for each variable. Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests are produced, for 1 to 10 lags in table 4.3.2 and all of the time series indicate stationarity.  
 
Table 4.3.1: Summary Statistics for Stock Variables and Nominated Market Index. 
 HSBC Santander Paribas Allianz UBS 
Mean -0.01085 -0.00308 -0.00434 -0.00650 -0.0541 
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Max 15.5148 23.2161 20.8968 19.4921 31.6614 
Min -18.7788 -11.9418 -17.2430 -12.9928 -17.2139 
 
 
Table 4.3.1 cont’d: Summary Statistics for Stock Variables and Nominated Market Index. 
 BBVA Lloyds Barclays Prudential ING Market 
Mean -0.01773 -0.0561 0.00397 0.0633 -0.01614 -0.04067 
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Max 22.0259 30.3454 25.2347 23.4568 29.2433 16.0399 
Min -12.7795 -33.9480 -24.8464 -20.0000 -27.4839 -9.8446 
 
 
Table 4.3.2: ADF tests for Stock Variables and Nominated Market Index at 1 to 10 lags 
 HSBC Santander Paribas Allianz UBS 
1 lag -29.6375* -28.7452* -27.0368* -29.7439* -29.4869* 
2 lags -25.0955* -24.4628* -24.8896* -23.9711* -25.6528* 
3 lags -20.8081* -20.5336* -20.6317* -18.9890* -22.1427* 
4 lags -18.4708* -19.0587* -19.0020* -18.9318* -19.8048* 
5 lags  -18.3841* -17.0540* -17.8355* -17.1769* -18.9323* 
6 lags -16.3363* -15.8188* -17.3884* -15.9228* -18.1326* 
7 lags -14.8635* -15.1684* -15.8632* -14.3038* -16.3678* 
8 lags -14.0897* -14.5235* -15.2712* -13.8153* -14.2962* 
9 lags -13.5885* -13.9113* -14.2249* -13.4396* -13.1934* 
10 lags -13.5424* -13.2921* -13.7288* -12.7183* -13.2103* 
Note:  Critical values of -3.43, -2.86, -2.57. * denotes test statistic < critical values at all levels. 
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Table 4.3.2 cont’d: ADF tests for Stock Variables and Nominated Market Index at 1 to 10 lags 
 BBVA Lloyds Barclays Prudential ING Market 
1 lag -28.2832* -26.5454* -26.3700* -31.1088* -28.2755* -28.4825* 
2 lags -23.4308* -22.4408* -22.6686* -27.1607* -24.8617* -24.3880* 
3 lags -20.0129* -18.9723* -19.3143* -21.0917* -20.8565* -19.8685* 
4 lags -18.5631* -18.7637* -18.2028* -20.9042* -18.9262* -18.8846* 
5 lags  -17.0573* -18.4707* -18.0698* -20.2356* -17.4280* -17.7456* 
6 lags -15.9146* -17.9940* -17.3072* -16.8913* -15.3486* -16.2391* 
7 lags -15.3991* -17.5633* -16.7939* -15.3235* -13.9018* -15.0126* 
8 lags -14.7386* -16.1846* -14.4821* -14.0162* -13.2297* -14.0283* 
9 lags -13.9369* -14.3095* -13.6645* -13.2138* -12.9712* -13.3302* 
10 lags -12.7559* -13.2877* -13.1145* -13.0608* -12.4902* -12.9091* 
Note:  Critical values of -3.43, -2.86, -2.57. * denotes test statistic < critical values at all levels. 
 
4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 The Absorption Ratio 
The AR is defined as the proportion of the total variation in the returns of a set of assets explained 
by a finite set of non-zero eigenvectors. According to Kritzman et al (2010), it is represented by 
the following expression: 
   ,-" = ∑ /012314(∑ /562764(              (4.2) 
   Where: ,-" refers to the absorption ratio at time t; 
    N = number of assets; 
    n = number of “non-zero” eigenvectors; 
    89:; = variance of the <"= non-zero eigenvector; 
    8>?; = variance of the @"=asset.  
 
 
The eigenvectors are derived specifically in relation to a covariance or correlation matrix of returns 
of a set of assets. The first eigenvector represents a particular linear combination of weights of 
each asset’s return. Subsequent eigenvectors depict linear combinations of the weights orthogonal 
to the preceding eigenvector and the proportions of the variation in the asset returns that they 
represent or explain reduce in value for each subsequent eigenvector. Furthermore, each 
subsequent eigenvector seeks to explain the variation in the asset returns not explained by the 
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preceding eigenvectors. For this data set daily absorption ratios are estimated for the entire data 
set where the associated correlation matrices and eigenvectors are derived on an EWMA16 basis 
from a rolling window of returns of 365 days.  
 
4.4.2 Eigenvectors and Eigenvalues 
According to Tsay (2010), in applying PCA to identify the sources of variations in the returns of 
ten assets, we have a k-dimensional vector of asset returns denoted by ->: 
                   -> = (!+, !;, !C, ……… . . !F)H							IℎK!K	L = 10,            (4.3) 
  which, for this data set, is equivalent to: 
        -> = (!OPQR, !PST", !USV:WSX,!>YY:STZ , ![QP, !QQ\>, !]Y^_`X, !QSVa, !UVb, !cde)H                   (4.4) 
 
A given portfolio of assets incorporates linear combinations of the asset weights and we can depict 
the weights as the following vector for assets 1 to L, where: 
  f: = (I:+,I:;, I:C, …… . . I:F)H                (4.5) ghi	I:+refers to the weight attached to asset 1 
Furthermore, the return of a multi-stock portfolio, “i”, containing L stocks and where each stock 
is assigned a weight I:, can be depicted as: 
  j: = f:-> ≡ ∑ I:?!?F?l+                                                   (4.6) 
where: I:+ refers to the weight attached to the 1st stock in portfolio “i”, !+ is the 
return associated with stock 1 in portfolio “i”, I:F  is the weight attached to stock k 
in portfolio “i” and !Fis the return associated with stock k in portfolio “i”. 
 
 
                                               
16 EWMA – Exponentially Weighted Moving Average – giving more weight to the more recent return observations 
in each 365-day window versus that given to the older return observations.  
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According to section 4.2.1, an objective of PCA in this context is to provide a means to explain 
correlations between stock returns through some linear combinations of the said returns, where the 
latter capture the variability in the original data set. Therefore, if we refer to principal component 
1 (PCA1) of ->	as being associated with a particular linear combination of the stock returns, then: 
  j+ = f+-> ≡ ∑ I+?!?F?l+             (4.7) 
Furthermore, PCA1 is intended to identify the particular linear combination of the stock returns 
that represents the maximum variability in such returns i.e. Var (j+) is maximised. 
The second principle component (PCA2) of ->, is denoted by the following linear combination: 
  j; = f;-> ≡ ∑ I;?!?F?l+             (4.8) 
                        where:	mg!(j+) > mg!(j;)	and	Cor(j;, j+) = 0	 
 
The vector of the linear combination of weights associated with a principal component is otherwise 
referred to as an eigenvector, E.  Therefore, for the <"=	component: 
 
  f: ≡ u: = (K:+,K:;, K:C,…… . . K:F)H                (4.9) 
  j: = u:-> ≡ ∑ K:?!?F?l+               (4.10) 
For PCA1: 
  f+ ≡ u+ = (K+,+,K+,;, K+,C, …… . . K+,F)H           (4.11) 
and,   j+ = u+-> ≡ ∑ K+?!?F?l+         (4.12) 
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An eigenvalue is associated with each principle component and eigenvector and denoted by v:	(<"= 
component), v+	(1st component), v;	(2nd component). The eigenvalue / eigenvector pairs are as 
follows: 
 											<"= component: (v:, u:),     1st component: (v+, u+),     2nd component: (v;, u;)     
  and: v+ > v; > vC > vw …………… .> v: > 0 
 
The proportion of the total variation in the stock returns explained by each component is the ratio 
of the individual eigenvalue divided by the sum of all of the eigenvalues for all of the identified 
components. Furthermore, only non-zero eigenvalues and vectors are considered. The larger the 
eigenvalue for PCA1, the greater the proportion of the variability in the asset returns that is being 
explained by it. Larger values for v+ indicate that a single component is impacting asset returns 
collectively, more than any others. As the influence of a single component increases, the 
implication is that all stocks are being impacted by it and this is because the stocks are tightly 
coupled. If this was not the case, then one component would not have such a significant influence 
across the board. 
 
4.4.3 Evaluating the Absorption Ratio 
Periods of tighter coupling are measured by significant changes in the absorption ratio over time. 
Such shifts can indicate market fragility and returns across institutions moving together. If they 
are moving in a unified manner, any negative shocks can impact institutions in the same way. I 
calculate a moving average of the daily AR on a two-week basis and subtract the moving average 
of the AR over one year – then I divide by the standard deviation of the moving average of the AR 
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over one year. 
 
   Δ,- = (>y2'z{{|&>y('}{~)/>y('}{~       (4.13) 
The shift is then compared with the percentage price movements in the market index to identify 
any indications of spikes in the AR being followed by a significant downturn in the market. 
 
 
4.5 Results and Inferences 
4.5.1 Movement in the AR versus the Market Index 
Figure 4.5.1.1 illustrates the movements in the underlying market index for the time-frame 30th 
December 2005 to 30th December 2011. There appears to be a period of sustained recovery in the 
index from March 2009 to February 2011. Accordingly, movement in the AR is observed from 
30th December to June 2009 to identify how closely the AR tracks the index and to identify any 
potential early-warning indications of market downturns.  
In generating the Absorption Ratios, there appear to be four key components identified as 
explaining the variability in the returns of the four stocks, with, as expected, principal component 
1 (PCA1) explaining the greatest proportion of that variability. Furthermore, PCA1 > PCA2 > 
PCA3 > PCA4. Summary statistics relating to the explanatory proportions assigned to each 
component are presented in table 4.5.1.1. 
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Figure 4.5.1.1: Graph of Price Movements in the MSCI Financials Sector Index 
 
 
Table 4.5.1.1: Summary Statistics for Each Principal Component – Assigned Explanatory Proportions 
 Principal 
Component 1 
Principal 
Component 2 
Principal 
Component 3 
Principal 
Component 4 
Total 
Proportion 
Across Top 4 
Components 
Maximum 0.7931 0.09385 0.0703 0.0742 0.9068 
Minimum 0.5252 0.0451 0.0245 0.0288 0.7464 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.06472 0.008826 0.007764 0.00859 0.04191 
Mean 0.67246 0.07051 0.05013 0.04336 0.83646 
 
The maximum variation explained by four key components is almost 91%, with 80% being 
attributed to PCA1 i.e. 80% of the variation in all of the stock returns is explained by PCA1. The 
minimum variation explained by four components is 75% with 52.5% relating to the first 
component. Given the explanatory provided in section 4.2.1, this result in itself is not surprising – 
markets in general now appear tightly coupled, and, subsequently, a very small number of risk 
factors can be found to drive variations in asset returns. Furthermore, one factor alone can 
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conceivably explain 70 to 80 percent of that variation in a single sector. 
In terms of further analysis, PCA1 is used when considering the movement of the AR in relation 
to the underlying market index. A comparison of the movement through time in the proportions 
attributed to PCA1 and to all four components is depicted in figure 4.5.1.2. It reflects a steady 
increase in the AR to a peak in the period July 2007 to September 2008 – coincidental with the 
building financial crisis. 
Figure 4.5.1.2: Proportion of the Variability in the Stock Returns Explained by PCA1 and All Four Components 
 
 
Figure 4.5.1.3 depicts the movement in the AR versus that of the underlying market index. In the 
earlier years, there does appear to be an inverse relationship between the level of the AR and the 
level of the underlying market index. It also presents that the AR increases quite significantly to 
its highest level during the financial crisis and fairly consistent with the fall in the price of the 
market index. However, it does not appear to be a pre-emptive or early-warning relationship and 
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in some instances seems to be lagging the index – for example the incline in the AR in 2007 is not 
exactly coincidental with the drop in the index, which begins in May 2007. A further 
contraindication occurs from October 2008, when the AR actually starts to reduce but the market 
index continues to fall quite significantly. This anomaly could be indicative of the sample size and 
applying just ten stocks in the analysis – future research could incorporate all stocks within a given 
market index, consistent with Kritzman (2010). Furthermore, as the market begins to recover in 
March 2009, the AR levels off and does not reduce significantly from its highest point. As 
indicated by Kritzman at al (2010), this could imply remaining fragility within the sector – in 
remaining quite high the AR reflects that the same component is explaining a large proportion of 
the movement in all ten stocks. Therefore, it can be argued that the stocks are still tightly coupled 
in their behaviour.  
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Figure 4.5.1.3: Movement in the AR (PCA1) versus the Price Level of the MSCI Financials’ Sector Index 
 
 
4.5.2 Inferences from Shifts in the AR 
The graphs are not indicative of the AR being useful as an early warning indicator of pending 
turmoil in the markets. However, certain inferences can be made through a comparison of shifts in 
the AR with the largest daily movements in the market index. For the worst percentage downturns 
in the market index, Table 4.5.2.1 presents the proportion of those occasions when there is a 
corresponding 1-sigma increase in the AR. 
Table 4.5.2.1: Number of times a % Drop in the Index is Accompanied by a 1-sigma increase in the AR 
 >1% drop in 
the index 
>1.5% drop 
in the index 
>2.0% drop 
in the index 
>2.5% drop 
in the index 
>3.0% drop 
in the index  
>3.5% drop 
in the index 
% of cases 
with at least 
a 1-sigma 
increase in 
the AR 
 
 
54% 
 
 
55% 
 
 
51% 
 
 
47% 
 
 
40% 
 
 
39% 
 
The figures in table 4.5.2.1 are further evidence of the AR not being an early warning indicator of 
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pending turmoil. In addition, it appears that the more severe the drop in the index, the lower the 
likelihood of an accompanying significant shift in the AR. However, at the very least, the shifts 
are consistent with figure 4.5.1.3. Some of the largest downturns in the market occur from October 
2008, when, intuitively, you would expect a corresponding increase in the AR – what actually 
occurs is a reduction and levelling off in the AR, thereby explaining the low number of occurrences 
of at least a 1-sigma shift.  
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
For the given data set, this empirical analysis is consistent with Kritzman et al (2010) in so far as 
the graphs themselves do not provide clear evidence of the AR acting as any kind of early warning 
indicator of market turmoil. Indeed, there appears a satisfactory inverse relationship with the 
market index but, at times, it appears to be lagging in nature. Furthermore, during the most 
significant period of the financial crisis, the AR eventually decreases and levels off. What 
Kritzman et al (2010) do provide is evidence that the majority of the worst market downturns are 
preceded by at least a 1-simga upward shift in the AR. They argue that the latter can then be used 
in day to day portfolio management to signal the need to switch between asset classes or reduce 
weightings in sectors that are deemed to be tightly coupled. For the data analysed in this chapter, 
the shifts in the AR do not infer similar findings – only half of the worst market downturns are 
preceded by at least a 1-sigma shift in the AR. However, the objective of this chapter was to 
substantiate the findings in chapter 3, through seeking to provide evidence of the connections that 
exist between financial institutions leading to the propagation or spreading in a crisis. In applying 
the Absorption Ratio, its consistently high level indicates the existence and extent of financial 
linkages and highlights the greater severity of the “spreading” effect when the links are strong. 
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Furthermore, a high AR suggests the stocks are more tightly coupled whereby a large proportion 
of the assets’ returns are explained by a single key component, PCA1. In this case, the proportion 
of the variation in the assets’ returns explained by one principal component remained between 0.70 
and 0.80 for much of the time. Such findings are important because the underlying data set 
encompasses financial institutions across two subsectors and a number of countries within Europe 
– thereby illustrating the extent of financial linkages. 
 
                      - 111 - 
 
 
Chapter 5: Applying a 
Bayesian Network to VaR 
Calculations 
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5 Applying a Bayesian Network to VaR Calculations 
5.1 Introduction 
In their survey of 31 quantitative measures of systemic risk, Bisias et al (2012) identify a research 
method in relation to Network Analysis in general. Specifically, a small network of factors is 
defined as being systemically important in relation to their impact on the returns of a set of 
financial entities. Where each factor is regarded as commonly significant to each entity. Existing 
research tends to focus on applying such networks in the assessment of how events spread through 
a financial system and interconnectedness in general. For example, simulating how the failure of 
one bank can trigger the domino effects across many and whether certain ones are more resilient 
to the default than others. Indeed, Chan-Lau et al (2009) and the IMF (2009a) use network models 
to assess the impact of a failing bank on others given respective exposures between them. While 
the specified networks can be used to quantify VaR losses at the bank level following the original 
default and subsequent domino effect, this is rarely discussed. This chapter thereby attempts to 
contribute to existing literature by applying a Bayesian Network of two factors to determine their 
impact on the returns of three UK banking stocks and their three-stock portfolio in terms of VaR.  
Identification of the factors isn’t necessarily intuitive but existing literature in relation to financial 
linkages and reasons for the spread in financial crises, can be drawn upon. For example, in chapters 
1 and 2, issues around market liquidity are raised and I suggest that the latter is an important factor 
when assessing impacts on stock returns. There are certain market indicators of the overall health 
and strength of liquidity among financial institutions, such as the LIBOR-OIS spread in the UK 
and the TED-spread in the US. Indeed, Hull and White (2013) suggest that, despite both spreads 
being stable and largely ignored pre-financial crisis, both are now used as the summary indicators 
of liquidity following their extreme movements in 2007 and 2008. Subsequently, in order to define 
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a workable network, I begin with just two factors – firstly the aforementioned liquidity factor and 
secondly, the influence of the wider financials’ sector on each stock. In terms of visualising the 
network, there are a series of nodes connected to each other by edges – where the latter represent 
the relationship between the nodes. Thereafter, the resulting model is used to simulate returns’ data 
for each bank and their three-stock portfolio and quantify their respective 5% and 1% quantiles -  
where the latter can be used in a VaR calculation and be reasonably applied as an alternative to the 
RiskMetrics approach. The network itself is specified using Bayesian techniques as presented by 
Scutari and Denis (2015) and Shonoy and Shonoy (2000). 
This chapter is divided into several parts. Section 5.2 highlights the recent literature in relation to 
Network Analysis and measuring systemic risk but also general applications of Bayesian Networks 
(BN). Section 5.3 presents the data, identifying each time series and summary statistics. 
Application of the BN to this data set in modelling stock returns is presented in section 5.4 – 
including specification of the network, the underlying probability distributions and tests of 
conditional independence and model specifications. The process for simulating stock returns is 
also discussed. Results are detailed in section 5.5 – specifically the respective significance of the 
partial correlations, the parameters of the BN model specifications and the comparisons of the 
simulated summary statistics and quantiles versus those of the actual returns. The chapter ends 
with concluding remarks.  
 
5.2 Relevant Literature 
A network rationale has been applied in a diverse range of social and behavioural science contexts. 
For example, considering how large corporations differ in the extent to which they offer support 
or assistance to local communities in which they have a presence. Corporate and social 
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responsibility dictates that they should be actively involved in their communities but how much of 
that is influenced by the activities of other corporations? A network can be used to model how 
such community involvement is influenced by their interactions and relationships with other 
corporations. Likewise, in any decision-making process involving several individuals or groups, a 
network approach can be used to understand how individuals within a group influence each other 
in the decision-making process. A common underlying theme is how the units within the network 
interact – they are not viewed in isolation. According to Faust and Wasserman (1994, pp. 7):  
 
“The network perspective differs in fundamental ways from standard 
social and behavioural science research methods. Rather than focus on 
attributes of autonomous individual units, the associations among these 
attributes, or the usefulness of one or more attributes for predicting the 
level of another attribute are theorised and modelled through a 
network.” 
 
Such associations and relationships can be witnessed in many other contexts, certainly within 
science, finance and economics. Indeed, the interlinkages and interconnectedness between 
financial institutions and within financial systems, as presented in chapter 1, are directly relevant. 
From a scientific perspective, networks are used in a variety of contexts – engineering, biology, 
ecology, medicine. For example, they are used to analyse ecological systems and specifically how 
the food chains and ecosystems are connected. In relation to public health, Luke and Harris (2007) 
present their use in the study of how diseases are transmitted, specifically HIV and AIDS. 
Applications in medical and microbiology contexts are popular – for instance, Barabasi et al (2011) 
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use network-based methods in genetics to identify molecular linkages and subsequent gene 
mutations.  
 
Of course, this thesis is interested in their application in finance and economics, specifically in 
relation to systemic risk. Given the focus on liquidity issues, particularly in the interbank markets 
in chapter 1, the work of Chan-Lau et al (2009), as previously mentioned, is particularly relevant. 
In using network models, they highlight the impact of institutional failure when there are exposures 
within such markets – where the network illustrates the domino effect between connected banks 
when exposed to a failing institution. Furthermore, Bilio et al (2010) go beyond the inter-bank 
markets in their application of Granger-causality networks to the study of interconnectedness 
between a variety of investor sub-groups, specifically hedge funds, banks, brokers and insurance 
companies. Likewise, the IMF (2012) assess linkages within the global OTC derivative markets 
and the identification of systemically important financial intermediaries. In each case, as suggested 
by Battiston et al (2012), there is no widely accepted, single methodology to determine the 
systemically important nodes or factors within the network – it is very much linked to 
interpretation and the underlying data set (financial instrument, market, sub-sector, region). The 
latter indicates the degree of qualitative judgement required in defining the network in the first 
instance. Nevertheless, Allen and Babus (2009, pp. 367) argue that network analysis can assist our 
understanding of financial systems and specifically risk contagion, given the interconnections 
revealed by the 2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, aside from defining the network itself, they 
suggest that it can then be usefully applied in formulating a regulatory framework for supervising 
financial institutions, an objective entwined within this thesis. Consistent with Allen and Babus 
(2009), Hu at al (2012) allude to the deficiencies of pre-existing methods in measuring exposures 
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to systemic risk, given the significant widespread losses post 2008. Accordingly, they too suggest 
a network-based approach as a more appropriate and accurate measurement and monitoring 
process.  
 
Unsurprisingly, there has been an upsurge in interest in research in this area - several empiricists 
more recently identify the importance of the use of network analysis. For example, Markose et al 
(2012) apply a network to investigate the connections between banks in the Credit Default Swap 
market – the latter market being identified as a key determinant of substantial losses in 2008. In 
some cases, there is the final realisation that, given their widespread application in science and 
medicine, surely analogies can be drawn in finance. For instance, Haldane and May (2011) apply 
the dynamics of food webs in an ecological context to modelling the stability of a given financial 
system. A leading empiriscist in relation to network theory, Kimmo Soramaki, has several 
publications focusing on applications in finance. For instance, Soramaki et al (2016) simplify 
complex network structures in order to filter or highlight the most important determinants of 
correlations between returns of European stocks. Earlier studies focus on the interbank payment 
systems and, specifically, the creation of a network representing how payments are transferred 
between financial institutions (see Soramaki et al (2007)). The latter highlights the key players in 
such markets and the degrees of connectedness between them but also makes the point that the 
“minor” players in the market are also connected to the tightly connected core of major players. 
Given the financial linkages, the network illustrates the severe impact of any subsequent disruption 
to it and the issues arising in transferring and accessing capital through the interbank markets. This 
is further explored by Soramaki and Cook (2013) and Soramaki and Langfield (2016), whereby, 
following a bank’s failure, the disruption to the payment network is identified along with 
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systemically important institutions and resulting impacts on individual network participants. A 
common theme, once again, is the interbank markets. It is clear that, whether referring to literature 
immediately following the crisis or more recently, that theme remains -  the liquidity issues 
generating from within the inter-bank markets. Similar to Chan-Lau et al (2009), Krause and 
Giansante (2012) also focus on the exposures within those markets and use a network of connected 
banks to model how failure of one spreads through the network.  Subsequently, a factor 
encompassed within the BN defined in section 5.4, relates to liquidity – denoted by a particular 
spread quoted in the inter-bank markets. 
 
Bayesian Networks are encompassed within the framework of network analysis and incorporate 
graphical theories and conditional dependencies between variables in the graphical network. 
Within the literature there are several instances of the application of BNs to data sets, not 
necessarily from a finance perspective. Indeed, almost any event conditional on the probability of 
a prior event can be analysed using this concept. In geographical and environmental studies, for 
example, a BN is used to evaluate flood plains and the extent of flooding given certain extreme 
prior events such as changes in sea level and improvements in coastal defenses (see Narayan et al 
2018). They are also applied within the context of Social Corporate Responsibility in assessing a 
corporation’s likely compliance with child labour regulations across their supply chain network. 
The BN is used to determine the likelihood of breaches to such regulations using available data on 
suppliers, their employee demographics and the frequency of child labour incidents (see Thoni et 
al 2018). From a medical research perspective, BNs are also readily applied. For instance, in 
assessing links between patients diagnosed with clinical depression and variability in their heart 
rates and also in identifying important factors in relation to survival rates from lung cancer (see 
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Anisa and Lin 2017).  
From a risk management perspective, there is ample literature relevant to their application, 
particularly in relation to operational risk. Essentially, various factors are identified and inserted 
into the BN with estimates made of associated loss distributions resulting from the various risk 
factors. According to Cowell et al (2007), such techniques can be applied in insurance settings 
when assessing the financial impact of cases of fraud upon the insuring company and thereby in 
the setting aside of adequate regulatory capital in relation to such cases. From a banking 
perspective, Aquaro et al (2010) present their application in relation to losses sustained through 
cases of failed internal processes, human error, IT failures and certain litigation cases. The factors 
leading to the losses in each situation become part of the BN and the associated loss distributions 
are generated. Clearly, there is some degree of subjectivity in identifying the break-downs in the 
internal processes or human interventions leading to loss making errors but, this is a commonality 
across all BNs, regardless of the arena in which they are being applied. In all cases, analogies can 
certainly be drawn with VaR and the need to ascertain the loss quantiles from subsequent returns’ 
distributions. Indeed, Martin et al (2005) apply BNs to specifically model the severest loss 
inducing events, referred to as the long tails or unexpected losses from an operational loss 
perspective – similar of course to the 1% and 5% VaR scenarios. Of direct relevance to this chapter 
is the research of Hager and Andersen (2010) who seek to model loss severity across all activities 
of a financial institution and not just from an operational perspective. This is done through the 
identification of influencing factors – which I argue can be liquidity and market based.  
Consistent with chapters 3 and 4, other literature identifies the importance of contagion through 
BN modelling of default probabilities resulting from financial linkages – for example Giudici and 
Spelta (2016) and Chong and Kluppelberg (2017). Furthermore, interconnectedness is also 
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examined through the effect of exposures within the interbank markets. A BN is applied to model 
individual institutional liabilities within that market and the subsequent impact on other banks in 
the event that a participant in the network defaults. Gandy and Veraart (2016) illustrate that the 
BN can be used to stress test differing assumed levels of inter-bank liabilities and likelihood of 
default conditional on another bank defaulting. At the very least it indicates the importance of the 
inter-bank markets once more, if not specifically assessing the impact on bank returns’ 
distributions. Despite all of the literature under review, there appears to be a lack of focus on 
application of BNs specifically in modelling stock returns and losses applied in VaR estimations. 
This chapter seeks to provide a workable alternative approach to modelling both, whilst also 
considering the importance of the entire financials’ sector and the reducing liquidity within the 
inter-bank markets. 
 
5.3 The Data 
In order to produce the appropriate network, and specifically assess the impact of the chosen 
factors, the data is gathered for the period 14th December 2000 to 29th June 2012 – implying 2,914 
daily observations for each variable. This timeframe incorporates the financial crisis but also 
adequate periods pre and post crisis. The data is sourced from Bloomberg (excluding the portfolio) 
and the variables are as follows, where the daily return and the daily percentage change ensure 
stationarity: 
• Daily returns for Barclays Bank stock; 
• Daily returns for Lloyds Bank stock; 
• Daily returns for HSBC stock; 
• Daily percentage change in the 3-month Sterling LIBOR vs. 3-month sterling 
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overnight index swap spread (OIS); 
• Daily returns for the MSCI Financials’ Sector Index: 
• Daily returns for the three-stock portfolio. 
 
The data set representing the impact of the market on each stock is the MSCI Financials Sector 
Index, within which all three banking stocks have a percentage weighting. The chosen liquidity 
factor represents the daily percentage change in the difference between the 3-month sterling 
LIBOR rate and the 3-month sterling overnight indexed swap rate. Overnight indexed swaps are 
interest rate swaps whereby a fixed rate of interest is exchanged for floating and the latter is the 
average of a daily overnight rate. In deriving the floating rate payment, the intention is to replicate 
the aggregate amount of interest that would be earned from rolling over a sequence of daily loans 
at an appropriate overnight rate. Given that we are applying a 3-month time-frame, it implies 
rolling over a sequence of daily loans, for 90 days at an overnight rate – where that rate is 
determined in the UK by the Bank of England and referred to as SONIA (sterling overnight index 
average). The 3-month sterling libor rate is the average interest rate at which a selection of banks 
lend British pounds to one another for a period of 3 months.  
In deriving the daily returns for each bank and the nominated market index, the following is 
applied: 
    !" = $%&$%'($%'(                     (5.1) 
Where:	*" refers to the closing price of the stock or index at time t. *"&+ refers to the closing price of the stock or index at time t-1. !" refers to the daily return of the stock or index at time t. 
 
 
With regards the three-stock portfolio, we begin with a total initial investment of £30,000,000, 
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split equally between the stocks – representing an equal weighting of 33.33% and £10,000,000 
invested in each stock in the portfolio. As the prices of the component stocks change in value, their 
weights in the portfolio change, as does the notional value of the portfolio. The daily return on the 
portfolio is derived as follows: 
 
  !$^V"," = d^":^TSY	\SYbÄÅÇ%,%&d^":^TSY	\SYbÄÅÇ%,%'(d^":^TSY	\SYbÄÅÇ%,%'(              (5.2) 
The notional value of the portfolio each day is derived as follows: 
 
 Ém$^V"," = Ñ(1 + !",Q) × Ém"&+,Qá + Ñ(1 + !",O) × Ém"&+,Oá + Ñ(1 + !",]) × Ém"&+,]á                 (5.3) 
 
 
Where:	Ém$^V"," refers to the notional value of the 3-stock portfolio 
at time t. !",Q refers to the daily return of Barclays at time t; Ém"&+,Q refers to the notional value of investment in Barclays at time 
t-1; !",O refers to the daily return of HSBC at time t; Ém"&+,O refers to the notional value of investment in HSBC at time 
t-1; !",] refers to the daily return of Lloyds at time t; Ém"&+,]  refers to the notional value of investment in Lloyds at time 
t-1.   
 
The graphs are presented for each time series of returns’ data in figures 5.3.1 to 5.3.5 plus an 
indication of how the LIBOR-OIS spread moved in the period under review in figure 5.3.6. The 
former illustrate stationarity in the time series and significant volatility in the 2007-2008 time-
frame of the financial crisis. In relation to the LIBOR-OIS spread, there are noticeable peaks 
associated with certain key events. For instance, in September 2007, the spread reached 85 basis 
points in response to the Bank of England announcing emergency funding to rescue Northern Rock 
and, three months later as the crisis began to unfold, reached an all-time high of 108 basis points. 
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At its worst, following the insolvency of Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008, the spread was 
around 300 basis points. The Augmented Dickey Fuller tests at various lags in table 5.3.1, indicate 
the stationarity in the time series of returns for each variable: 
 
Table 5.3.1: Augmented Dickey Fuller tests for each variable 
 LIBOROIS Market Barclays HSBC Lloyds 
1 Lag -47.0068* -38.5601* -36.5903* -41.127* -38.3401* 
2 lags -40.925* -33.0937* -30.3896* -33.8231* -31.5608* 
3 lags -33.7785* -27.1927* -25.4275* -28.0044* -27.0613* 
4 lags -29.4624* -26.0475* -23.5451* -25.5346* -26.8292* 
5 lags -24.4209* -24.5432* -21.8710* -24.7745* -25.0340* 
6 lags -22.0149* -22.1618* -20.8262* -21.6686* -23.5661* 
7 lags -20.7559* -19.8397* -19.6280* -19.5955* -21.9056 
8 lags -18.6174* -18.4505* -17.2105* -18.2352* -20.2806* 
9 lags -17.3829* -17.9787* -17.1425* -17.7670* -18.0233* 
10 lags -16.8473* -17.4447* -16.3418* -17.9372* -16.7871* 
   Note:  Critical values of -3.43, -2.86, -2.57. * denotes test statistic < critical values at all levels.  
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Figure 5.3.1: Time Series of Barclays Daily Returns. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.2: Time Series of HSBC Daily Returns. 
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Figure 5.3.3: Time Series of Lloyds Daily Returns. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.4: Time Series of Market Daily Returns. 
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Figure 5.3.5: Time Series of Portfolio Daily Returns. 
 
Figure 5.3.6: Graph of the LIBOR-OIS spread. 
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In relation to the summary statistics presented in table 5.3.2, the mean daily returns appear close 
to zero and the minimum returns reflect the substantial losses during the financial crisis.  
 
Table 5.3.2: Summary Statistics for LIBOROIS % change, Market, Stock and Portfolio Daily Returns. 
 LIBOROIS Market Barclays HSBC Lloyds Portfolio 
Max 141.6667 16.0399 29.2357 15.5148 32.2159 21.2197 
Min -67.6692 -9.8446 -24.8464 -18.7788 -33.9479 -16.3841 
Median 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0501 0.0000 -0.0504 -0.0076 
Mean 0.7612 -0.0223 -0.0076 0.0024 -0.0429 -0.0183 
 
 
5.4 Application of a Gaussian Bayesian Network to Continuous Data 
 
5.4.1 Proposed Network Structure 
In applying Bayesian Networks to modelling data, they are useful in the situation where 
information is incomplete and uncertainty exists over the key determinants of the dependent 
variable. According to Shenoy and Shenoy (2000), there is initially a degree of qualitative 
judgement and subjectivity in specifying the factors to include in the graphical representation of 
the network. However, in subsequently applying quantitative tests of the model and simulating 
posterior data distributions, certain inferences can be made about its validity. In this instance the 
proposed network is being applied to model portfolio returns based on certain inputs or factors 
added to it. Furthermore, given the simulated posterior return distribution of the portfolio, a cut-
off return is derived for use in a VaR calculation, where the cut-offs refer to the 1% and 5% 
quantiles of the said distribution. 
In specifying a Gaussian Bayesian Network, I am modelling continuous data sets with the 
underlying assumption of multivariate normality. With regards the variables defined in section 5.3, 
I denote them with the following abbreviations: 
• Daily returns for Barclays Bank stock→B 
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• Daily returns for Lloyds Bank stock→L 
• Daily returns for HSBC stock→H 
• Daily percentage change in the 3-month Sterling LIBOR vs. 3-month sterling 
overnight index swap spread (OIS)	→S 
• Daily returns for the MSCI Financials’ Sector Index→M 
• Daily returns for the three-stock portfolio→P 
 
 
Prior to tests of conditional independence, the suggested relationships between variables are as 
follows: 
B is directly influenced by S and M, L is directly influenced by S and M, H is directly influenced 
by S and M and P is directly influenced by B, L and H. Consequently, the proposed relationships 
are defined as follows: 
 																	{$, &} → (, {$,&} → ),							{$,&} → *,			{(, ), *} → +	            (5.4) 
 
5.4.2 Proposed Network Graph and Probability Distribution 
Based upon the above suggested relationships between the variables a graphical representation can 
be defined – as presented in figure 5.4.2.1. It is referred to as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and 
contains a series of arcs and nodes. The former reflect the direct dependencies between variables 
and the latter reflect the variables within the network. Each variable or node has its own 
distribution – for example, ‘B” has a distribution or time series of daily returns. If an arc exists 
from one variable to another, the latter variable is dependent upon the former, otherwise known as 
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the parent. The overall distribution, encompassing all variables and suggested dependencies, can 
be depicted as follows: 
 Pr($,&, (, ), *, +) = Pr($) Pr(&)Pr	((|$,&)Pr	(*|$,&)Pr	()|$,&)Pr	(+|(,*, ))						 
 
Furthermore, the distributions at each node can be expressed as: 
 (|$ = 2,& = 3      *|$ = 2,& = 3      )|$ = 2,& = 3       +|( = 4,* = ℎ, ) = 6 
 
where, the distribution at each node is conditional on the values of its parents. Rather than 
determining the overall joint probability distribution encompassing all variables from the outset, 
the Bayesian Network (BN) approach breaks the distribution into sub-groups and derives the local 
distributions at each node. Scutari and Denis (2015) present that specifying a joint probability 
distribution is rather difficult and complex given the numbers of variables and correlations 
requiring estimation. Therefore, the BN overcomes this modelling issue through specifying the 
local distribution at each node conditional on the values of the parents.  
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Figure 5.4.2.1: Proposed DAG of Relationship Between 2 factors, Stock Returns and Portfolio Returns 
 
 
5.4.3 Algebraic Representation of the DAG 
The conditional relationships for each of the nodes of the three stocks may be specified as an 
equation, consistent with the assumptions that 1) every node follows a normal distribution and 2) 
the equations represent a Gaussian linear model incorporating an intercept, with the node’s parents 
as the explanatory variables. The specifications in this case, for each factor and stock are as 
follows: 
   $~8(9:, ;:<)      &~8(9=, ;=< )          (5.5) 																(>$ = 2,& = 3~8(?@ + BC,@2 + B<,@3, D@<)                                       (5.6) 																*>$ = 2,& = 3~8(?E + BC,E2 + B<,E3, DE<)                                      (5.7) 
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																		)>$ = 2,& = 3~8(?F + BC,F2 + B<,F3, DF<)                                       (5.8) 
Where: ? refers to the intercepts, B refers to the regression coefficients for the 
parents, S and M and D represents the standard deviation of the residuals. 
 
 
There is no specification for the three-stock portfolio because its subsequent simulated returns are 
derived using equations (5.2) and (5.3).  
 
5.4.4 Testing for Conditional Independence 
As each arc in the DAG encompasses a probabilistic dependence, conditional independence tests 
can be used to assess whether the data actually supports it. In terms of hypotheses, for each 
variable, the following conditional dependencies are being tested: 
 *G: (	I2	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	&|$     versus    *C:(	I2	JQN	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	&|$ *G: (	I2	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	$|&     versus    *C:(	I2	JQN	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	$|& *G: *	I2	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	&|$     versus    *C: *	I2	JQN	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	&|$ *G: *	I2	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	$|&     versus    *C: *	I2	JQN	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	$|& *G: )	I2	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	&|$     versus    *C: )	I2	JQN	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	&|$ *G: )	I2	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	$|&     versus    *C: )	I2	JQN	IJKLMLJKLJN	OPQ3	$|& 
 
The null hypothesis depicts that B, H or L may be independent from M given S or S given M. If 
the null is proven, the Beta coefficients in equations 5.6 to 5.8 are equal to zero. Using “B” as an 
example, through the hypotheses, the partial correlation between B and M given S or S given M, 
is being tested – denoted by R@,=|: or R@,:|=. The null holds if R@,=|: or R@,:|=	is not statistically 
different from zero. In the test, the appropriate distribution is a student’s t distribution with n – 3 
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degrees of freedom (where n refers to the total number of observations in each time series of B, H 
and L and 3 refers to the number of variables in the test e.g. B, S and M).  
  NSR@,=|:T = R@,=|:	U <VCCCWXY,Z|[\                                                         (5.9) 
The null hypothesis of independence is rejected if the corresponding p-value is less than the 10%, 
5% and 1% degrees of significance.  
 
5.4.5 Simulating the Returns’ Distributions 
Following the independence tests in section 5.4.4, the parameters of equations 5.6 to 5.8 are 
estimated using the maximum likelihood estimator. Each time-series of bank returns, as the 
response variables, are regressed on the time-series of the daily percentage change in the 
LIBOROIS spread and the daily returns in the market index. Having determined the parameters of 
the models proposed by the DAG in section 5.4.3, they are then used to simulate sets of random 
variables for each node, B, H and L. Simulation is performed from the BN by generating a sample 
of random values from the joint distribution of the specified nodes. It is performed following the 
order implied by the arcs in the DAG – from the parents first, followed by the children (LIBOROIS 
and the Market being the parents, the 3 banks being the children). For each node, 2,914 random 
values are generated – depicting estimates of the daily returns for each stock. In each case, the 
simulation is performed on the basis of both a normal distribution and a student’s t-distribution, 
using the “rnorm” and “rt” functions in R-studio.  
 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Tests of Conditional Independence 
For each of the banks, inverse correlation matrices are produced, which are required for the 
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significance tests and generation of p-values. The resulting correlations are presented in tables 
5.5.1.1 to 5.5.1.3.  
Table 5.5.1.1: Correlation Matrix for Barclays versus 2 parent nodes 
 Barclays Returns LIBOROIS Market 
Barclays Returns 1.0000 0.0332 0.7818 
LIBOROIS 0.0332 1.0000 -0.0827 
Market 0.78718 -0.0827 1.0000 
 
Table 5.5.1.2: Correlation Matrix for HSBC versus 2 parent nodes 
 HSBC Returns LIBOROIS Market 
HSBC Returns 1.0000 0.0306 0.7828 
LIBOROIS 0.0306 1.0000 -0.0805 
Market 0.7828 -0.0805 1.0000 
 
Table 5.5.1.3: Correlation Matrix for Lloyds versus 2 parent nodes 
 Lloyds Returns LIBOROIS Market 
Lloyds Returns 1.0000 0.0192 0.6953 
LIBOROIS 0.0192 1.0000 -0.0787 
Market 0.6953 -0.0787 1.0000 
 
The respective significance tests for the partial correlations are presented in table 5.5.1.4 In all 
cases, the bank returns have a significant positive correlation with the market (M) given the daily 
percentage change in the LIBOROIS spread (S) and we can thereby reject the null hypothesis of 
independence given the extremely small p-values at all levels of significance. In relation to the 
conditional dependence between the bank returns and the LIBOROIS variable, given the market 
returns, there is positive correlation but at a low level. Furthermore, the p-values only indicate 
significance at the 10% level. However, at that level of significance the null hypothesis of 
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independence is rejected and we can surmise that there is a degree of conditional dependence 
between daily bank returns and the chosen indicator of liquidity in the financial markets. Thereby, 
both factors, deemed to be the parents in the DAG, can subsequently be applied in the modelling 
of the bank returns.  
Table 5.5.1.4: Significance Tests of Partial Correlations 
 (~$|& (~&|$ *~$|& *~&|$ )~$|& )~&|$ 
Pearson’s 
Correlation 
0.0332 0.7818 0.0306 0.7828 0.0192 0.6953 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
2911 2911 2911 2911 2911 2911 
P-Value 0.0729* 0.0000*** 0.0991* 0.0000*** 0.0990* 0.0000*** 
Note: * denotes significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.    
 
5.5.2 Parameters of the BN Model Specification 
Following the Gaussian linear regression for each bank, the respective maximum likelihood 
estimators are produced and presented in table 5.5.2.1. Values for the intercepts (?@, ?E]JK	?F) 
and contributions of the parents, as depicted by the Beta coefficients, are provided.  
Table 5.5.2.1: Parameters of the BN Model for the returns of each bank ?@ ?E ?F BC,@ B<,@ BC,E B<,E  BC,F B<,F D@< DE<  DF< 
0.0175 0.0174 -0.019 0.0053 1.304 0.0028 0.769 0.0036 1.197 1.95< 1.15< 2.32< 
 
The contributions from the LIBOROIS variable are small but the value of the spread itself is also 
and percentage changes in the daily returns of any stock are rarely sizeable.  
Referring back to equations 5.6 to 5.8, the BN model specifications, following the linear 
regression, are as follows: 							(|$ = 2,& = 3~8(0.0175 + 0.00532 + 1.3043,			1.952)                              (5.10)                                          						*|$ = 2,& = 3~8(0.0174 + 0.00282 + 0.7693, 1.152)                          (5.11) 						)|$ = 2,& = 3~8(−0.019 + 0.00362 + 1.1973, 2.322	)                         (5.12)   
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															$~8(0.76, 12.39<)      &~8(−0.0223, 1.88<)  
    
Equations 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 are then applied in simulating sets of returns for the three bank 
stocks. 
 
5.5.3 Simulated Data         
Following the simulation of time series of returns for each of the three bank stocks and subsequent 
three-stock portfolio, a comparison is made between the summary statistics of the original, actual 
data sets and the simulations, applying both a normal and student’s t-distribution. Both are 
presented in tables 5.5.3.1 to 5.5.3.4. 
 
Table 5.5.3.1: Comparison of Summary Statistics – Actual versus Simulated Returns - Barclays 
 Barclays Actual 
Returns 
Simulated Returns 
(Normal Dist’n) 
Simulated Returns 
 (t-distribution) 
Mean -0.00759% -0.02102% 0.06029% 
Max 29.2357% 10.45150% 11.02510% 
Min -24.8464% -9.75948% -10.64131% 
Median -0.05013% 0.01165% 0.06097% 
Stdev 3.13367% 3.14959% 3.25881% 
 
Table 5.5.3.2: Comparison of Summary Statistics – Actual versus Simulated Returns - HSBC 
 HSBC Actual Returns Simulated Returns 
(Normal Dist’n) 
Simulated Returns 
 (t-distribution) 
Mean 0.002432% -0.008251% 0.03320% 
Max 15.51481% 6.407118% 7.63505% 
Min -18.77880% -6.580565% -7.42987% 
Median -0.00000% 0.038593% 0.07663% 
Stdev 1.84544% 1.82093% 2.13113% 
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Table 5.5.3.3: Comparison of Summary Statistics – Actual versus Simulated Returns - Lloyds 
 Lloyds Actual Returns Simulated Returns 
(Normal Dist’n) 
Simulated Returns 
 (t-distribution) 
Mean -0.04285% -0.09143% -0.07486% 
Max 32.21586% 10.26661% 10.93075% 
Min -33.94790% -11.76306% -11.21700% 
Median -0.007604% -0.02116% 0.000267% 
Stdev 2.13653% 1.61464% 1.802019% 
 
Table 5.5.3.4: Comparison of Summary Statistics – Actual versus Simulated Returns - Portfolio 
 Portfolio Actual 
Returns 
Simulated Returns 
(Normal Dist’n) 
Simulated Returns 
 (t-distribution) 
Mean -0.018333% -0.04074% 0.011784% 
Max 21.21970% 6.19230% 6.413994% 
Min -16.38410% -5.72795% -5.939262% 
Median -0.007604% -0.021160% 0.000267% 
Stdev 2.13653% 1.61464% 1.802019% 
 
Given that the mean return is expected to be close to zero, in all cases the simulated values are 
consistent. Furthermore, the simulated standard deviations match the actuals with reasonable 
accuracy. Of greater relevance is the model’s ability to derive meaningful estimates of minimum 
returns, given the implications for VaR. For each bank and the portfolio, the estimated minimum 
returns are significantly different from the actual values. However, given the underlying 
assumption of a Gaussian BN and normality, it will not necessarily correctly evaluate the tails of 
the distribution. It is encouraging that, when applying a t-distribution, the resulting minima are 
larger than in the normal case for three of the four data series – consistent with its ability to model 
tails more effectively. Despite the clear differences in summary statistics, it is important to 
consider the relative accuracy of the model in relation to quantiles. After all, they are used as the 
cut-off points in relation to VaR calculations. Given that the most severe maxima or minima values 
for daily returns occur so infrequently, they are not necessarily an accurate indicator of the most 
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likely maximum daily loss. Thereby, a comparison of the quantiles from the actual returns and the 
simulated cases are presented in tables 5.5.3.5 to 5.5.3.8.  
 
Table 5.5.3.5: Comparison of Quantiles – Actual versus Simulated - Barclays 
Quantile Barclays 
Actual 
Simulated 
(Normal 
Dist’n) 
Over / Under 
Estimates 
Simulated  
(t-distribution) 
Over / Under 
Estimates1 
1% -8.786% -7.782% Under -7.479% Under 
5% -4.372% -5.174% Over -5.288% Over 
10% -3.069% -3.976% Over -4.123% Over 
90% 2.939% 3.854% Over 4.287% Over 
95% 4.785% 5.035% Over 5.482% Over 
99% 8.641% 7.322% Under 7.708% Under 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.5.3.6: Comparison of Quantiles – Actual versus Simulated - HSBC 
Quantile HSBC Actual Simulated 
(Normal 
Dist’n) 
Over / Under 
Estimates 
Simulated  
(t-distribution) 
Over / Under 
Estimates1 
1% -5.279% -4.215% Under -4.718% Under 
5% -2.546% -3.065% Over -3.529% Over 
10% -1.835% -2.382% Over -2.774% Over 
90% 1.849% 2.289% Over 2.752% Over 
95% 2.689% 3.008% Over 3.615% Over 
99% 5.107% 4.154% Under 5.035% Under 
 
 
 
Table 5.5.3.7: Comparison of Quantiles – Actual versus Simulated - Lloyds 
Quantile Lloyds Actual Simulated 
(Normal 
Dist’n) 
Over / Under 
Estimates 
Simulated 
(t-distribution) 
Over / Under 
Estimates1 
1% -8.893% -7.859% Under -7.809% Under 
5% -4.408% -5.390% Over -5.523% Over 
10% -3.051% -4.204% Over -4.394% Over 
90% 2.920% 3.927% Over 4.210% Over 
95% 4.468% 5.268% Over 5.318% Over 
99% 9.079% 7.487% Under 8.264% Under 
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Table 5.5.3.8: Comparison of Quantiles – Actual versus Simulated - Portfolio 
Quantile Portfolio 
Actual 
Simulated 
(Normal 
Dist’n) 
Over / Under 
Estimates 
Simulated  
(t-distribution) 
Over / Under 
Estimates1 
1% -5.874% -3.881% Under -4.236% Under 
5% -3.099% -2.766% Under -2.997% Under 
10% -2.187% -2.106% Under -2.312% Over 
90% 2.079% 2.027% Under 2.300% Over 
95% 3.163% 2.641% Under 2.938% Under 
99% 6.423% 3.582% Under 4.318% Under 
 
In all cases, the simulated 1% quantiles from the simulated returns, are less than those based upon 
the actual time series of returns. Perhaps not surprising given the underlying normal distribution 
assumption. However, the related simulated 5% and 10% quantiles are larger than those on an 
actual basis. This implies greater prudence in subsequent VaR estimates due to the left tail being 
larger in the simulated cases if the quantiles are used as the appropriate cut-off. Despite the under-
estimations at the 1% level, the simulated results are still of use in a practical context due to the 
industry convention of reporting VaRs at the 5% level for individual stocks. The simulated 
portfolio quantiles are slightly misleading given that they are impacted by the respective weights 
of the component stocks. They are, nevertheless, comparable to the portfolio actual quantiles at 
both the 5% and 10% levels.  
Application of the t-distribution, allows for a more realistic modelling of the tails. Consequently, 
in the simulations, the resulting 1% and 5% quantiles for all stocks are even more prudent than in 
the normal case.  
Table 5.5.3.9 illustrates the absolute percentage increases in the 5% and 10% quantiles offered by 
the simulated results. At the 5% level, the increases in the quantile range from 0.5% to just over 
1%. From a regulatory perspective, and the setting aside of regulatory capital based on VaR 
assessments, an additional 1% would be significant – if we consider the notional values of stocks 
and equity portfolios. 
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Table 5.5.3.9: Absolute % increase in 5% and 10% quantiles offered by Simulated Data 
 Barclays  
Normal 
Dist’n 
HSBC  
Normal 
Dist’n 
Lloyds 
Normal 
Dist’n 
Barclays  
t-dist’n 
HSBC  
t-dist’n 
Lloyds 
t-dist’n 
5% 0.802% 0.519% 0.982% 0.916% 0.983% 1.115% 
10% 0.907% 0.547% 1.153% 1.054% 0.939% 1.343% 
 
Finally, figures 5.5.3.1 to 5.5.3.3 reflect the fitted distributions of the simulated stock returns 
according to the underlying assumption of normality. 
Figure 5.5.3.1: Barclays Fitted Simulated Returns             
 
Figure 5.5.3.2: HSBC Fitted Simulated Returns 
Figure 5.5.3.3: Lloyds Fitted Simulated Returns   
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Consistent with the quantiles reflected in tables 5.5.3.5 to 5.5.3.7, the left tails in the fitted 
distributions reflect the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. For example, the 1% quantile for Lloyds being -
7.859% and reflected in the spread of the left-hand side of figure 5.5.3.3. Figure 5.5.3.4 reflects 
comparisons between the original and simulated returns for each stock on the basis of an assumed 
Chi-Squared Distribution. In each case, the outcomes are similar. 
Figure 5.5.3.4: Comparative Graphs of Original versus Simulated Squared Returns and Chi-Squared Distribution: 
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provided a BN approach to modelling stock returns. The data was sourced from 
Bloomberg and included time series of daily returns for three UK banks, namely, Barclays, HSBC 
and Lloyds. A subsequent portfolio was constructed from the three stocks. Using a degree of 
qualitative judgement, a DAG was constructed using the evidence presented in chapter two with 
regards factors being important in relation to their impact on stock returns. In this instance, the 
market and the liquidity factors were selected with the latter being represented by the 3-month 
LIBOR versus OIS spread.   
The DAG suggested conditional dependencies between the factors and stock returns, subsequently 
verified by conditional independence tests and partial correlations. Whilst low levels of 
significance were indicated for the liquidity factor, it did still exist and the linear regression models 
were specified for the returns of each stock.  The latter were subsequently used to simulate time 
series of returns. Summary statistics and quantiles were compared for the actual returns and the 
simulated returns. Whilst the simulated returns underestimated minimum values, the quantiles 
were comparable at the 5% and 10% levels. The latter suggests that the underlying Gaussian BN 
(GBN) could be applied in modelling stock returns and could be further used to estimate quantiles 
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and VaR cut offs. Although it does assume normality, and may be regarded as over-simplifying 
the modelling issues, its comparable estimations are a positive. An objective in this instance was 
to suggest a workable alternative to the RiskMetrics approach in deriving VaR. As suggested by 
Scutari and Denis (2015), a more complex specification may be preferred but relatively simple 
models often perform better. Indeed, the widely used RiskMetrics approach is convenient to apply 
and well understood but, I suggest that the GBN is as intuitive and, furthermore, appears to provide 
prudent estimates for the quantiles used as the cut-offs in VaR calculations. Given that losses were 
underestimated in the 2008 financial crisis applying VaR techniques of the time, a model resulting 
in a potential 1% increase in regulatory capital would be an improvement. Based on a portfolio 
with a notional value of £1 billion, it would result in at least an additional £10 million in regulatory 
capital.  
There are, of course, certain limitations with this technique, not least of which is determining the 
DAG structure in the first instance. Subsequently, if the structure is ascertained, there may be 
issues with data being readily available representing the components of the DAG – for example 
sourcing regular data in relation to balance sheet indicators such as levels of indebtedness or rising 
levels of delinquencies amongst bank customers.  Furthermore, although the network can be 
altered or updated for new components, as the number of variables grows, the simulation methods 
may produce less reliable estimations.
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A 3.6.2.1: Graph of rankings per financial institution for their 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR (at tau = 0.95) and whole 
sample: 
 
A 3.6.2.2: Graph of rankings per financial institution for their 1% VaR and Delta-CoVaR (at tau = 0.99) and whole 
sample: 
 
Both graphs illustrate that an institution with the largest 1% individual VaR does not necessarily have the largest 
Delta-CoVaR. In many cases, an institution is ranked highly for individual VaR but not for Delta-CoVaR.  
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